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COMMENTS
A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF REDISTRICTING OR
REAPPORTIONMENT LAW: STATE AND FEDERAL*
One of the most controversial areas within the legal spectrum today
is redistricting or reapportionment law.' Recent Supreme Court redistricting decisions2 have had a national impact rivaling even the famed
school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Educ3 Unlike the
school desegregation issue, however, reapportionment law is a complex
area, replete with distinctions and qualifications.
I.

PRE-BAKER STATE COURT VIEW

Judicial examination of legislative redistricting, while currently in
the public eye, is not a new concept or radical departure from traditional law. State courts had entered the "political thicket" of legislative
redistricting long before Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v.
Green4 expressed doubts on the advisability of judicial trespass. These
courts were concerned with whether a given redistricting act violated
the state (not federal) constitution. This concern centered itself around
three considerations: population equality among the various districts,
contiguity of territory, and compactness of territory. In order to understand the legal ramifications of redistricting today, it is necessary to
examine the legal effect of these factors as developed in state courts
prior to Baker v .Carr.5 Before a state court would examine these factors on their merits, however, it was necessary that it find itself possessed of requisite jurisdiction and the plaintiff possessed of standing to
sue.
Jurisdictionand Standing to Sue
Traditionally, state courts have found little difficulty in assuming
*The Law Review Board acknowledges that Attorney James W. Rector, Jr.,
formerly clerk to Justice Beilfuss of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
presently with the firm of Godfrey & Kahn, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, substituted
for the regular faculty advisor in the construction of this article.
Certain political scientists have urged a rather arbitrary distinction between
the terms "redistricting" and "reapportionment." Harvey, Reapportionments of
State Legislatures-Legal Requirements, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 364
(1952); Comment, 1955 Wis. L. RFv. 125 n. 1. The term "reapportionment,"
it is argued, refers to the allotment of representatives among already existent districts. "Redistricting" refers to the creation or change of legislative
or congressional districts. This distinction is simply not made in the cases.
Furthermore, a reapportionment system (as that term is limited by the distinction) could raise constitutional questions under the equal protection
clause as it would require the allotment of at least one representative from
each of the existent districts. If granting a given district even one representative would create substantial population inequalities within the apportionment as a whole, the apportionment would be unconstitutional. WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). In this article the terms "redistricting"
and "reapportionment"are used synonymously.
2
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
5 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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jurisdiction of redistricting disputes. This is evidenced by the fact that
in only a comparatively few cases has the matter of jurisdiction been
an issue. Insofar as a redistricting statute partakes of the qualities of
any state law, some state court has jurisdiction to pass upon the judicial
aspects of its constitutionality. 6 A question occasionally raised in early
redistricting cases was whether the state supreme court had original
jurisdiction in redistricting controversies or whether original jurisdiction was in some lower state court. The general rule was that such jurisdiction had been given to the supreme court by the state constitution
or statutes in conferring upon it the jurisdiction to issue the original
writs of injunction, prohibition, and mandamus. 7
The second matter which had to be resolved before a state court
would consider a redistricting dispute upon the merits was the problem
of standing to sue. State courts, historically, have held two views on
whether a private citizen living within the state may sue to invalidate
an unconstitutional redistricting. One view was that a private citizen
possessing the right to vote8 has standing to bring suit. Some courts
have held that this standing exists whether or not the wrong complained
of affects the district in which the plaintiff votes. 10 Thus, John Citizen
living in County A might sue to invalidate the state's redistricting act
even though his suit alleged that only Counties B, C, E, and Z were
underrepresented or gerrymandered. John Citizen had a direct personal
6 Denney v. State ex rel. Basler, 144 Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896).
7 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724
(1892); Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892); Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146 P. 2d 564 (1943), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,

322 U.S. 717 (1944). Sometimes original jurisdiction is conferred upon the

supreme court by a specific redistricting provision in the constitution. Smith
v. Board of Apportionment, 219 Ark. 611, 243 S.W. 2d 755 (1951). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court post-Baker took original jurisdiction of a dispute
concerning the apportionment of county boards as an action for declaratory
judgment even though the Wisconsin constitution nowhere specifically authorized it to do so. It felt that Wis. CONST. art. 7, §3 (the section granting
the supreme court original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs, authorized it to exercise its judgment and discretion in assuming jurisdiction of
cases having so widespread and important an effect upon the rights and liberties of the people of Wisconsin as to warrant intervention by the supreme

court. State ex. rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 25 Wis. 2d 177, 130 N.W. 2d
569 (1964). As a pure matter of grammar, it is rather difficult to see how this
construction may be drawn from the rather limiting words of article 7, §3.

8The author could find no pre-Baker cases stating specifically whether the
plaintiff was required simply to possess the qualifications to vote or whether
he must actually have voted. In most if not all the cases, plaintiff on the
facts was a voter. The author's impression is that possession of the qualifica-

tions to vote would have been sufficient. See, e.g., cases cited note 9 infra. The
federal court position on this issue is just as uncertain. It appears certain, how-

ever, that the plaintiff there, as in the state courts, would have to possess at

least the qualifications to vote. Baker v. Carr, supra note 2, at 204-06.
9 Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904); Jones v.
Freeman, supra note 7; Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W. 2d 315
(1931). In some states the right of the individual voter to bring suit is expressly provided for in the state constitution. In re Sherrill, 188 N.Y. 185,

81 N.E. 124 (1907).

10 Brooks v. State ex iel. Singer, supra note 9; Jones v. Freeman, supra note 7;

Stiglitz v. Schardien, supranote 9.
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interest in the constitutional distribution of legislative representatives
throughout the state. This interest might be affected by overrepresentation in other counties as well as by underrepresentation in his own. The
second view advanced by state courts was that a private citizen may
bring suit to test a redistricting law if the attorney general refuses to
do so."' This usually meant that John Citizen must first request the
attorney general to bring suit. The theory of state courts taking this
position was that an invalid redistricting violated primarily a public
rather than a private or personal right. John Citizen did not suffer a
personal wrong distinguished from many of his fellow voters; rather,
the public as a whole suffered due to the unconstitutional actions of its
state officers (e.g., the state legislators who passed the act, the state
official who calls the elections under it). Redistricting was, therefore,
a matter publici juris and the attorney general was the official whose
duty it was to bring suits vindicating the public right.12 John Citizen,
therefore, was first required to request the attorney general to challenge
the existing redistricting law. If the attorney general refused or otherwise by his actions indicated he would not bring suit, John Citizen had
standing to sue. Some courts which adopted this general viewpoint held
that a request was not necessary if it appeared certain to the court that
the attorney general would have refused had he been requested to bring
suit.3 The Wisconsin court post-Baker has allowed the Governor as
well as the attorney general (in their public capacities) to commence
a parens-patriaetype action vindicating the public right in a redistricting
4
dispute.'
PopulationEquality Among Districts
Once a state court had decided that it possessed jurisdiction and
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham. supra note 7; State ex rel.
Lamb v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 124-30, 53 N.W. 35 (1892) ; Everitt v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 1 S.D. 365, 47 N.W. 296 (1890); Giddings v. Blacker,
supra note 7.
12 State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, supra note 11; MERRILL, MANDAMUS
§§229-30 (1892). Once his request to the attorney general has been refused,
a private citizen in post-Baker Wisconsin apparently has the right to challenge the constitutionality of a state law apportioning a purely local body
governing a county other than his own. But how much further this goes and
to what other situations it applys, query? State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 132 N.W. 2d 249 (1965). It might make a difference that the law
challenged in the Sonneborn case was a law of general application to 70 out
of 72 counties. (Thus, when the law was declared invalid, it was invalid as
to all counties, including the plaintiff's.)
13 Giddings v. Blacker, supra note 7; Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrigation
Co., 9 Colo. 248, 11 Pac. 103 (1886) (strong dictum). The attorney general,
for example, without formally refusing to sue, might indicate sufficiently his
position by defending the redistricting act when John Citizen challenges it.
Possibly contra, State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note
7; State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, supra note 11.
14 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 22 Wis. 2d 544, 126 N.W. 2d 551 (1964).
This case does not indicate whether the Governor must request the attorney
general to sue before suing in his public capacity. As a matter of fact, the
Governor, before continuing suit, did request the attorney general to sue and
the request was refused.
11
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that the plaintiff had standing to sue, it was ready to consider the redistricting issue upon the merits. The first of the three key factors
often at issue in redistricting disputes is population equality. A population equality problem arises when a state redistricting act' 5 or constitution'16 creates districts of unequal population, each district receiving
the same or an otherwise disproportionate number of representatives,
or creates districts of equal population but grants to each an unequal
number of representatives. If, for example, District A has three times
the population of District B, and District B receives one state senator
while District A receives two, then, although each resident of District A
casts one vote, the value or weight of his vote has been diluted. It is
worth only two-thirds as much as the vote of a resident of District B.
The power of a resident of District A to vote has not been interfered
with or deprived, but the value of his vote, if he in fact votes, has been
lessened.'7 The question is whether a court recognizing such inequality
in a given redistricting act can invalidate that act and, if so, whether
it can compel the legislature to enact a fair redistricting, either directly
or indirectly.
The state court answer to this question was many-faceted. If the
legislature passed a redistricting statute containing population inequalities alleged to violate the constitution (and thus not pursuant to any
constitutional formula), state courts had the power to invalidate it. It
was necessary, therefore, that the state constitution contain a provision
directly or impliedly requiring population equality in districting. If it
did, then the question at issue (whether or not the constitutional provision was violated) was judicial and not political.'
The mere fact that a constitutional provision calling for population
equality renders a redistricting dispute based on population inequalities
justiciable means only that a court would decide the issue before it.' 9
15 Redistricting

power usually lies in the hands of the state legislature. See, e.g.,

WIs. CONST. art. IV, §3. Legislatures have sometimes allowed appointive
boards or elected county bodies to do the actual redistricting. Sometimes the
constitution empowers another body to do the actual redistricting. Pickens v.
Board of Apportionment, 220 Ark. 145, 246 S.W. 2d 556 (1952).
16 E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, §4, contains an apportionment formula: "The
ratio for apportioning senators shall always be obtained by dividing the
number of inhabitants excluding aliens, by fifty, and the Senate shall always
be composed of fifty members, except that if any county having three or
more Senators at the time of any apportionment shall be entitled on such
ratio to an additional Senator or Senators, such additional Senator or Senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty Senators, and the
whole number of Senators shall be increased to that extent."
2 Thus, cases vindicating a citizen's right to vote, such as United States v.

Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915), Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), and

United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), are not foursquare precedents
in malapportionment differences. They have sometimes, however, been cited
as such.
'8 Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836 (1882); State ex rel. Harte v.
Moorhead, 99 Neb. 527, 156 N.W. 1067 (1916) ; State ex reL Morris v. Wrightson, 56 N.J. 126, 28 Atl. 56 (1893).
19 The presumption of constitutionality applies to redistricting acts, as it does
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It is necessary, then, to examine what criteria have influenced state
courts in the past to invalidate a given redistricting act on the basis of
population inequalities. The one law review writer touching upon this
precise point suggests a sort of "high-low district" criterion:
The standard most often used by courts is a comparison between the largest and smallest district, according to population
in relation to each other and the average or theoretically perfect
district. These cases suggest that when the standard is equality
of population, an apportionment plan resulting in one district
containing more than double the population of another would
be invalid. The collected state cases show that an almost equal
number of legislative apportionment laws resulting in ratios of
under two to one, supposedly apportioned on the basis of population, have been sustained or invalidated while virtually every
over a two to one ratio has been delaw yielding districts with
20
clared unconstitutional.

The "high-low district" criterion does not appear adequate to explain
court opinions in this area. By admission, it does not explain those cases
in which redistricting acts have been invalidated on the basis of population inequality even though the difference in population between the
highest and lowest districts was less than two to one. 21 Nor does it
explain the many state court decisions sustaining districting acts alleged
to violate constitutional provisions on population equality even though
the high-low district difference was greater than two to one.22 This
theory, moreover, cannot explain those cases in which a court decided
the issue of population equality without even mentioning the population
figures of the highest and lowest districts. 22 The recent Wisconsin case
of State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman,24 already a landmark in state
court redistricting, cannot be reconciled with this theory, for Calumet
County (the smallest assembly district) has a population of 22,268
to all other legislative acts. People ex rel. Heffernan v. Carlock, 198 Ill. 150,
65 N.E. 109 (1902) ; State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 Pac. 274
(1898) ; State ex rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540, 159 Pac. 777 (1916).
20 Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment,72 YALE L. REV. 81, 93 (1962).
21 Brooks v. State ex. rel. Singer, supra note 9 (smallest district-10,787, largest
district-17,775) ; State ex. rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note
7 (smallest district-38,690, largest district-68,601) ; Brown v. Saunders,
159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932) (smallest district-183,934, largest district336,654).
22 State ex reL. Bowman v. Dammann, 209 Wis. 21, 243 N.W. 481 (1932)
(smallest district-16,037, largest district-58,000) ; Graham v. Special Comm'rs, 306 Mass. 237, 27 N.E. 2d 995 (1940) (smallest district-6,107, largest
district-12,427) ; Stenson v. Secretary of State, 308 Mich. 48, 13 N.W. 2d
202 (1944) (smallest district-27,807, largest district-76,222). These cases
are cited by Goldberg, himself, supra note 20, at 104 (Appendix B).
23 Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456, 256 N.W. 1 (1934) ; Armstrong v. Mitten,
95 Colo. 425, 37 P. 2d 757 (1934) ; People ex rel. Heffernan v. Carlock, supra
note 19.
2423 Wis. 2d 606, 128 N.W. 2d 16 (1964). This is not a pre-Baker case. It is
cited here simply to indicate that even in a model court-drawn districting,
the disparity is greater than 2 to 1.
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and Walworth County (the largest assembly district) has a population
of 52,368.
It is not so much the ends of the curve as the deviations in the
middle that have concerned state courts in redistricting cases, although
for rhetorical effect, it seems, courts often talk of highs and lows. The
most important test used by state courts in determining whether a districting act was invalid because of population inequality was the degree
of avoidable underrepresentation afforded by the act 2 5 The best way to
define underrepresentation is by example. If the total number of districts is divided into the total population of a state, an ideal or perfect
district number is arrived at.,To the extent that the population of a
given district is greater than the population of the ideal district, that
district is underrepresented. To the extent that it is less, the district
is overrepresented (assuming one representative per district). Mathematical equality among districts is, of course, impossible. The best of
apportionments can only approximate equality. 6 Overrepresentation
has been regarded with considerably less concern than underrepresentation.2 7 Where the underrepresentation has been substantial (considering the state or other area redistricted as a whole), state courts have
many times invalidated the offending act.2 s Where it is minimal or

where there is no alternative plan by which it could constitutionally
be avoided, districting acts have invariably been sustained.2 9
25 In State ex rel. Bowman v. Damman, supra note 22, for example, where the
population difference between the highest and lowest districts was far greater
than 2 to 1, the Wisconsin court sustained a redistricting act in which it could

find only 3 instances of avoidable underrepresentations in 71 redistricted
counties. On the other hand, in the following cases apportionments were

invalidated, the degree of avoidable underrepresentation being considerable.
Brown v. Saunders, supra note 21; Stiglitz v. Schardien, supra note 9; People
e.x. rel. Pond v. Board of Supervisors, 19 N.Y. Supp. 978 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
20 N.Y. Supp. 97 (Sup. Ct. 1892) ; Parker v. State, supra note 18; Brooks v.
State ex rel. Singer, supra note 9; Merril v. Mitchell, 257 Mass. 184, 153 N.E.
562 (1926).
.26Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note 7; Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916).
27 Overrepresentation does not necessarily correspond with underrepresentation. A situation can exist where there is substantial overrepresentation but
little underrepresentation. Suppose State A's legislature decides to redistrict
it into 71 assembly districts. It then substantially overrepresents Districts A,
B, C, and D by giving them substantially more representation than the ratio

of their population to the first ideal district population would entitle them.

After doing this, a second ideal district population is computed by dividing
the total- remaining districts (67) into the total remaining state population.
Each of the 67 districts is then given a population close to the second ideal
district number. In this way the deviation per district above the first ideal
district number (the underrepresentation) will most probably be low. For
a good study on the various mathematical methods used in redistricting, see
the memorandum of H. Rupert Theobald, M.A., filed with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in April 1964.
28 Brown v. Saunders, supra note 21 (see especially table at 106); Stiglitz v.
Schardien, supra note 9 (tables at 318 and whole tenor of opinion strongly
suggest that underrepresentation is the prime consideration) ; People ex rel.
Pond v. Board of Supervisors, supranote 25.
29People v. Board of Supervisors, 148 N.Y. 187, 42 N.E. 592 (1896); Brophy
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When underrepresentation or overrepresentation among districts
was coupled with lack of compactness and/or contiguity of territory in
a particular redistricting act, state courts have been more willing to
invalidate the act on any of these grounds than they perhaps would
have been had only population inequalities been evident. 30 This, then,
was the second test or criterion used by state courts (in the relatively
few instances where the facts permitted) in judging the validity of redistricting acts alleged to contain population inequalities.
A modified version of the "high-low district" criterion previously
criticized might be offered as the third test without, however, much case
law substantiation. When the difference between the highest and lowest
districts was, in the court's opinion, extreme and the reason for such
variation lay in legislative policy rather than constitutional accident,
at least one state court invalidated the districting act although there
was no substantial avoidable underrepresentation in the area redistricted
as a whole. 31 The utilization of this criterion would, to an extent, involve a court in the examination of legislative intent. State courts have
repeatedly denied looking into the legislative intent behind districting
acts. 32 Yet, a reading of the cases in this area leads one to conclude that
courts often do examine legislative intent.3 3 The three criteria, then,
used by state courts to test a redistricting act passed by the legislature
for population inequalities were the degree of avoidable underrepresentation, the extent to which population inequalities were combined
with lack of compactness and/or contiguity of territory, and the degree
of variation between high and low districts resulting from legislative
34
policy rather than constitutional accident.
The foregoing tests were applied to redistricting acts passed by the
legislature. An entirely different legal situation arose when the legislature simply failed to act. Suppose, for example, that the state of
Ruralism's constitution commands the legislature to redistrict after
each federal census. Ruralism's legislature, however, has refused to
v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass. 124, 113 N.E. 1040
(1916); City of Lansing v. Ingham County Clerk, 308 Mich. 560, 14 N.W.
2d 426 (1944); Attorney General v. Secretary oi the Commonwealth, 306
Mass. 25, 27 N.E. 2d 265 (1940). A districting act might not be sustained,
although underrepresentation was minimal, if a court applied one of the
other two tests discussed in the text.
30 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note 7; Williams v.
Woods, 162 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); In re Timmerman, 51 Misc.
192, 100 N.Y. Supp. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1906). Compactness and contiguity of territory are discussed apart from population equality in the text pp. 524-526
infra.
31 State ex rel. Harte v. Moorhead, supra note 18.
32Ibid.; In re Livingston, 96 Misc. 341, 160 N.Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1916)
People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895).
33See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note 7; State
ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, supra note 11. A reading of these cases leads
one to conclude that the court was influenced to some degree by what (right
or wrong) it considered the legislature's intent.
34 While these tests are, perhaps, nowwhere explicitly formulated, they appear
a key to the otherwise inexplicable maze of state court decisions in this area.
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perform its constitutional duty and has not redistricted since 1901.
Consequently, representatives are still elected under the 1901 districting
act. John Citizen, living in a city whose population has grown immensely
since 1901 as compared to many of the more rural districts, finds that
the weight of his vote has been diluted. If he sues, will the court compel the legislature to perform its duty? The unanimous answer of preBaker state courts was "no." A court could not by mandamus compel
a co-ordinate branch of the government to act. The question was a
political one to be resolved in the ballot box, not the courtroom. The
controversy was simply not justiciable. 35 The two Wisconsin Cunningham36 decisions are cited as unique in this area by the American Law
Reports 37 in that they indirectly compel the legislature to act. In the
first Cunningham case, the Wisconsin court held the redistricting act
before it invalid and demanded a special session of the legislature to
pass a valid act on the veiled threat of no election. (The court stated
that it would be perfectly proper for a state to have no valid apportionment act and implied that all previous apportionment acts were
invalid.) Later Wisconsin decisions, however, retreated from this position, holding (while nowhere explicitly overruling Cunningham) that
the legislature might not be compelled to do its duty even by such an
38
indirect mandamus.
Thus John Citizen, in the sample situation, could not compel the
legislature to do its duty. Could he sue to have the 1901 act declared
unconstitutional? Most state courts held he could, since the 1901 act
was an action of the legislature upon which a court could adjudicate.3 9
If the 1901 act, however, had at some time in a court action been declared constitutional, at least one state court has held that it could not
40
by the mere passage of time become unconstitutional.
Once a pre-Baker state court had determined that a given redistricting act was unconstitutional on the basis of population inequality,
the problem arose as to what form of remedy or relief the plaintiff
could secure. The usual remedy was a simple declaration that the act
or acts before the court were unconstitutional and that until a new act
was passed, the last districting act (prior to the act or acts declared
unconstitutional) that was enforced and not specifically declared unconFergus v. Marks, 321 Il. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
State ex reL Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note 7; State ex rel.
3 7 Lamb v. Cunningham, supra note 11.
Annot., 46 A.L.R. 964, 966-67 (1927).
3s State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101, 23 IN.W. 2d 610 (1946);
State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398, 52 N.W. 2d 903 (1952).
39 This is not to infer that he could obtain any relief even if the court decided
that the act was unconstitutional. The form of relief available, if any, as
will be pointed out, was dependent upon several additional factors.
40 State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, supra note 38. State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Zimmerman, supra note 14, a very recent case, overruled Martin on this
35
36

specific point.
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stitutional would be in effect. 41 A minority of courts refused any relief
(even though they often termed the act in question unconstitutional) if
a return to the last act that was enforced would have simply increased
under- or overrepresentation.4 2 Even courts adhering to the majority
view, however, would refuse to invalidate the offending act if there
was no prior districting act or if all prior districting acts had been declared unconstitutional. 43 The reason behind this refusal was that if the
court invalidated the offending act, the state would have no districting
act at all. In this situation, elections could not be held until a new districting act was passed by the legislature. With the exception of the
Wisconsin court in the two prophetic Cunningham decisions, 44 such an
indirect method of mandamusing the legislature was repugnant to all
pre-Baker state courts.
One state court has, pursuant to constitutional provision, actually
redistricted the state itself. 45 Unless specifically directed to do so by
such a constitutional provision, however, court redistricting as a remedy
was out of the question in pre-Baker days. Not only was it regarded
as an indirect attempt to mandamus the legislature, but also as the exercise of legislative power, since districting was a legislative rather than
judicial function.

4G

Contiguity of Territory
Contiguity of territory is the second key factor which concerned
state courts in redistricting disputes. As with population equalities, a
constitutional provision requiring contiguity of territory was necessary
before a state court would consider a dispute as to its existence justiciable.47 Contiguity of territory as a constitutional requirement means
that all land within each created district must be contiguous or physi-1 Giddings v. Blacker, supra note 7; Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich.
447, 108 N.W. 749 (1906) ; Stiglitz v. Schardien, supra note 9; In re Sherrill,
supra note 9. Technically, this would usually be accomplished by issuing the
appropriate writ (prohibition, injunction, or mandamus) to the ministerial
officer charged with calling elections.
12Jones v. Freeman, supra note 7. In this case the court held it had jurisdiction of the action by reason of its constitutional power to grant the extraordinary writs (in this instance, mandamus). If an extraordinary writ is an
inapplicable remedy in the first instance, a court has no jurisdiction of a case
solely by reason of its power to issue that writ when appropriate. The court
held that mandamus was an inapplicable remedy because, if granted, it would
simply increase already existent population inequalities. It does not explain
how its general power to issue mandamus gives it jurisdiction over a case
where the issuance of a mandamus would be improper.
43 Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind. 71, 44 N.E. 37 (1896); State ex rel. Winnie v.
Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 86 Pac. 237 (1900); Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo.
479, 95 Pac. 698 (1908). A state court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the state
government.
44 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note 7; State ex" rel.
Lamb v. Cunningham, supra note 11.
45 Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, supra note 15.
46 Jones v. Freeman, supra note 7.
47 Almost every state constitution contains such a provision; see, e.g., Wis.
CONST. art. IV, §§4 ("to consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact
form as practicable"), 5 ("of convenient contiguous territory").
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cally touching. 48 A question sometimes arises as to whether land separated by a large body of water (e.g., a lake), but no intermediate land,
is contiguous. State courts generally held that it was not unless it completely surrounded the water body (in which event it might not be
compact) or unless the land sought to be adjoined to the shore land
consisted of an island too small in itself to be a district. 49 The requirement of contiguous territory was strictly enforced by state courts. This
was so even if a districting plan containing districts with contiguous
territory would require greater population inequalities among the districts than a districting plan containing districts with noncontiguous
territory. The usual remedy in a suit alleging noncontiguous territory
was a declaration that the act (or acts) under attack was unconstitutional and that, until the passage of a new act by the legislature, the
last prior redistricting act that was enforced and not specifically declared
unconstitutional would be in effect.50
Compactness of Territory
The third key factor which concerned state courts in redistricting
disputes is compactness of territory. A constitutional provision calling
for compact territory was necessary before a state court would consider
a dispute on this issue justiciable.53 The term "compactness of territory" means simply that the territory of each created district must be
closely united.5 2 What constitutes a closely united district is not an easy
question to answer. Certainly, the mere fact that a district is given a
jagged rather than smooth boundary would not impair close unity.
What is compact in a rural area might not be in a city. One judge
(dissenting) has accurately suggested that compactness involves not
only "territorial compression but . . . density of population and such

53
considerations as convenience of access and unity of interest.1
So long as a districting act contained reasonably compact districts,
state courts would not invalidate it on this ground. Perfect compactness
was neither possible nor required.5 4 Generally a doubt as to compactness would be resolved in favor of the legislature. 5 Unlike the require-

In re Sherrill, supra note 9. State courts sometimes permitted rejoinder of
non-contiguous territory if such joinder were the only way to prevent violation of a constitutional provision forbidding division of counties in the formation of legislative districts. In re Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 420, 96 N.E. 87, affiing 128 App. Div. 881, 115 N.Y. Supp. 1114 (1911).
49
Houghton County v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638, 52 N.W. 951 (1892).
50 The author could discover no cases stating what the remedy would be if
there was no prior districting act or if all prior districting acts had been
declared unconstitutional.
51 Almost every state constitution has such a provision; see e.g., Wis. CoNsT.
art. IV, §§4-5.
52 People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, supra note 32.
53 In re Sherrill, supranote 9, at 139.
54 Ibid.
55 Cases in which redistricting acts have been invalidated on the ground of noncompactness generally appear to contain extreme violations. In re Timmerman, supra note 30, for example, had two assembly districts, "one of
48
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ment of contiguous territory, territorial compactness was considered
less important than population equality. If greater population equality
among districts could be achieved by making the districts slightly less
compact, it was necessary to do so.56 It does not appear, however, that
compactness could be entirely ignored in securing greater population
equality.57
II. THE FEDERAL POSITION
Unlike state courts, federal courts have only recently considered the
justiciability problem in reapportionment disputes. The United States
Supreme Court in 1946 squarely held that congressional redistricting
suits were not justiciable and strongly implied that state legislative reapportionment contests followed the same rule."' The Warren Court in
1962 overturned this ruling when it held that all redistricting disputes
were justiciable.5 9 In 1964 the Supreme Court declared that the Constitution requires all reapportionment acts to afford substantial equality
60
These rulings reflected the Court's
of population among districts.

belief that the Constitution as a document is the embodiment of a
particular political philosophy (representative democracy as opposed
to republic). The Court is no longer to be a mere passive regulator,
but rather a positive force in securing the fruits of that philosophy.
Colegrove v. Green
Colegrove v. Green,6 1 decided in 1946, was the first significant fed-

eral districting case. Appellants, several Illinois voters, alleged that the
Illinois Congressional Districting Act violated the Congressional Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, and the United States'Constitution
because it allowed population inequalities and noncompact districts. The
Court indicated that it could dispose of the case simply by citing Wood
v. Broom0 2 which held that the Congressional Reapportionment Act of
which commences on the westerly margin of the city, and runs thence along
its westerly boundary in a southeasterly direction 1y miles having an average
width of Y2 mile. It then takes an abrupt turn to the north for 1/2 miles,
with an average width of 1/ of a mile, and with some further turnings, it
runs westerly for 2 of a mile, having an average width of 4 of a mile, and
then turns southeasterly for Y4 of a mile, having a width at some points of
but two city blocks. It then turns at right angles, and in a northeasterly direction for Y of a mile [being between 5 and 6 miles in length, and having
thirty sides or faces, while another has thirty-one sides or faces, the lines
of which divide five wards of the city]." 100 N.Y. Supp. at 58.
56 State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham supra note 11; People ex rel. Woodyatt v.
Thompson, supra note 32. A constitutional provision forbidding the division
of county lines in the formation of representative districts was also regarded
as more important than compactness.
5 The usual remedy in a suit alleging noncompetent territory was a declaration that the act (or acts) under attack was unconstitutional and that, until
the passage of a new act, the last prior districting act that was enforced and
not specifically declared unconstitutional would be in effect.
5s Colegrove v. Green, supra note 4.
59 Baker v. Carr, supra note 2.
6o Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 2.
61 Colegrove v.Green, supra note 4.
62 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
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June 18, 1929, did not contain or incorporate the provisions of the
Congressional Reapportionment Act of August 8, 1911, requiring compactness of territory and approximate equality of population. The
Court, however, did not choose to rest its decision upon this narrow
legal basis. Unlike the Wood Court,.3 the Court in Colegrove stated that
the controversy in dispute was not justiciable. Redistricting contests,
it felt, involved the Court in political questions not meet for judicial
determination.
Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters
that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party
contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has
traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.6 4
The remedy for malapportionment, the Court noted, lies in the election
of state legislators who will properly redistrict and in the House of
Representatives' power under article I, section 5, of the United States
Constitution to reject unqualified members. The Court did not comment
upon the practical possibility of either of these so-called remedies.
Colegrove did not have much over-all effect on prior state law.
Few, if any, state courts adopted its point of view. 5 The reason for this
was that prior state law in all its niceties and complexities provided
against all the dangers feared by the Colegrove Court while still holding
most redistricting disputes justiciable. 6
Insofar as the decision in Colegrove turned upon the fact that the
dispute in question was deemed nonjusticiable, a significant problem
concerning jurisdiction of the subject matter and standing to sue in the
federal courts arises. Lack of jurisdiction in a federal court means that
the cause either does not 'arise under' the Federal Constitution,
laws or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Article 3 Section 2), or is not a 'case or controversy'
In Wood, the Court expressly refused to consider the question of justiciability.
64 Colegrove v. Green, supra note 4, at 553-54. The majority opinion in Colegrove was that of only three Justices. Mr. Justice Rutledge, who concurred,
and the three Justices who dissented all felt the issue was justiciable.
65 Some courts cited Colegrove but did not alter their pre-existing law. Watts v.
O'Connell, 247 S.W. 2d 532 (Ky. 1952); State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman,
66 supra note 38.
It is difficult to conceive that even the Colegrove Court would have applied
its rule in the extreme situation. Suppose, for example, the Wisconsin legislature were to apportion 8 out of its 10 congressmen to Milwaukee County.
Would the Colegrove Court have found a dispute as to this apportionment
nonjusticiable? There is some evidence that lower federal courts were dissatisfied with Colegrove and sometimes refused to follow it. Dyer v. Kazuhise
Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii), rev'd as moot, 256 F. 2d 728 (9th Cir.
1958); Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958); 177 F. Supp.
803 (D. Minn. 1959); WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. N.Y.
1961); 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. N.Y. 1961), rev'd and remanded, 370 U.S. 190
(1962).
63
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within the meaning of that section;
or the cause is not one de67
scribed by any jurisdictional statute.

Standing to sue means only that the plaintiff (distinguished from his
fellow citizens generally), has some vital interest which will be affected
beneficially or adversely by a judicial determination of the dispute. 68
Jurisdiction of the subject matter and standing to sue, therefore, do not
involve a consideration of the merits of the action. Justiciability, on
the other hand, does involve a consideration of the merits, at least to
the point of determining
whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its
breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right
69
asserted can be judicially molded ....
It is only common sense that a court will not reach the merits of an
action until it has determined (expressly or by implication) that the
necessary preliminaries (jurisdiction and standing to sue) exist. Now
the Court in Colegrove nowhere explicitly stated that federal courts
possess jurisdiction or that individual plaintiffs have standing to sue
in congressional redistricting cases. However, since it decided the issue
of justiciability over and above the issue as to the meaning of the Congressional Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, it can be argued
that the Court found federal court jurisdiction and individual standing
to sue in congressional redistricting cases apart from any jurisdiction
conferred by virtue of the fact that the Congressional Reapportionment
70
Act of June 18, 1929, was a federal law.
It has been argued that federal court jurisdiction and standing to
sue in all redistricting cases have long prior to Colegrove become settled
nooks in constitutional law.7' The argument is a good one if limited to
congressional redistricting cases. In such cases the federal question
67 Baker v. Carr, supra note 2, at 198.
68 Id. at 204. Cases which define generally the meaning of standing to sue in the

federal courts are: Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) ; Ex-Cell-O
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 115 F. 2d 627 (7th Cir. 1940). It is apparent, therefore, that the federal courts have adopted the view of some state courts (see
text p. 517 supra) that a private citizen has standing to sue (without first requesting the attorney general to do so) as he has a deep personal interest in
the apportionment of his elective bodies. It is not clear whether the plaintiff
must simply possess the qualifications to vote or be an actual voter. Baker v.
Carr, supra note 2, at 204-06 n. 26.
69 Baker v. Carr, supra note 2, at 198.
70 The only direct comment as to jurisdiction in Colegrove is: "This is one of
those demands on judicial power which cannot be met by verbal fencing
about 'jurisdiction.'" 328 U.S. at 552. The following comment has sometimes
been interpreted as indicating that the Colegrove Court found the plaintiff's
without standing to sue: "This is not an action to recover for damage because of the discriminatory exclusion of plaintiff from rights enjoyed by
other citizens. The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong
suffered by Illinois as a polity." Ibid.; cf. Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of this comment in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra
note 14, 126 N.W. 2d at 556.
71 Baker v. Carr, supra note 2, at 201, 206.

19651

COMMENTS

conferring jurisdiction upon federal courts could arise under a number
of explicit provisions in the United States Constitution, such as article
I, sections 2 and 4.72 No such explicit constitutional provisions exist,
however, with regard to the selection of state legislative districts.
Baker v. Carr
The first Supreme Court case squarely holding that federal courts
possessed jurisdiction and that individual plaintiffs could sue to test
apportionments of state legislatures was Baker v. Carr, decided in
1962. 73 The Tennessee legislature had failed since 1901 to perform its
state constitutional duty and redistrict the state. Plaintiffs, individual
voters in various Tennessee counties, alleged that their votes had been
diluted, denying them equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. The district court, uncertain whether Supreme
Court cases denying relief were based upon lack of federal court jurisdiction or nonjusticiability of the redistricting issue, held that it lacked
jurisdiction to try the suit and that the issue in dispute was not justiciable. The Supreme Court, therefore, ruled only on the issues of
jurisdiction, standing to sue, and justiciability. It did not endeavor to
determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to relief, nor what form that
relief should take.
The Court first stated that federal courts possessed jurisdiction to
try disputes concerning apportionment of state legislatures. It noted
the difference between jurisdiction and justiciability, indicating that
cases such as Colegrove, in terming the redistricting issue non-justiciable, affirmed by implication the existence of federal court jurisdiction. It cited, however, only one case which could be taken as holding
by implication that federal courts had jurisdiction over suits attacking
apportionment of state legislatures (i.e., as distinguished from suits
attacking selection of congressional districts) .4
The individual plaintiffs (voters in allegedly underrepresented counties) possessed, in the Court's view, standing to sue. They had a direct,
immediate, personal interest in the effectiveness of their votes.
The most revolutionary part of the Baker decision was its holding
that a suit to test the constitutionality of a state legislature's failure
to redistrict was justiciable. A political question is: not justiciable. But
every case involving the protection of a political right does not necessarily involve a political question. A political question exists when there
72

Ohio ex tel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355 (1932). On the issue of jurisdiction, all Supreme Court cases prior
to Baker seem to have dealt with congressional districting.
7 Note 2 supra. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), may have assumed that
federal courts possessed jurisdiction and that there was standing to sue in
cases of this type, but it certainly did not squarely so hold.
7 Baker v. Carr, supra note 2, at 203. The case was South v. Peters, supra
note 73.
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is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a co-ordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements
75
by various departments on one question.
A resolution of the redistricting issue in dispute, the Baker Court felt,
involved none of these difficulties. The Tennessee legislature and the
United States Supreme Court, it stated, are not coordinate or coequal
bodies. Judicial determination of the controversy would not embarrass
the Government at home or abroad. The equal protection clause was the
judicially manageable standard against which redistricting acts calling
for apportionment of state legislatures could be tested. Redistricting
disputes, the Court declared, do not involve political questions but
political rights, and as such they are justiciable.
The chief difficulty with Baker v. Carr, was that it failed to provide
any definition of the term "equal protection of the laws" as applied to
redistricting cases. Prior to Baker, the equal protection clause had been
invoked by the Court with relative infrequency except in the areas of
racial discrimination and criminal procedure.16 As a concept, it meant
only that a state might not discriminate by unreasonable classification.
Simply because a man was indigent, he should not be denied the right
to appeal. 7 Simply because a man has black skin he should not be denied
the right to attend the state's only law school.78 So long as the classification was reasonable, there was no invidious discrimination and no
denial of equal protection.
When the theretofore little used concept of equal protection was
applied to redistricting disputes, a severe problem of interpretation arose
among law review writers and courts. Did it constitute an unreasonable
classification to underrepresent cities with a view toward allowing rural
opinion to have some weight in what would otherwise be a predominantly urban legislature, especially if commanded to do so by the state constitution? Was it invidious discrimination to only slightly underrepre75 Baker v. Carr, supra note 2, at 217.
76 Emerson, Malapportionmentand Judicial Power, 72 YALE L. J. 64 (1962).
77 A state does not have to grant the right to appeal in criminal cases. If it does,
however, the equal protection clause requires that the state make the right
of appeal equally available to the indigent prisoner by supplying him free of
cost with the transcript necessary in order to take the appeal, if this is the
method required for securing appellate review. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956). A state may not, consistent with the equal protection clause, impose a financial barrier to the filing of a motion for leave to appeal to the
state supreme court on the ground that indigents can appeal to an intermediate appellate court for review. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
78 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) ; Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
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sent certain areas but not flagrantly gerrymander? Where was the
classification line to be drawn-with the man or the political unit?
Obviously, confusion reigned. Most courts and law review writers seem
in effect to have concluded that what the Supreme Court meant to do
was adopt some sort of variation of the prior state court redistricting
rules. A redistricting act to satisfy the equal protection clause (in their
view) would have to be reasonable. If there was underrepresentation,
a legislature would have to have some justifiable and evident reason
for allowing it.79 In other words, they felt, Baker was intended to prevent only the extreme case, the obvious gerrymander, the flagrant failure
of the legislature to perform its constitutional duty. 0 How wrong they
were.
The SubstantialEquality Rule
Early in 1964, the Supreme Court began to clarify its views on the
subject of legislative districting. In Wesberry v. Sanders"x the Court
held that the constitutional test for the validity of congressional districting plans was substantial population equality among districts. Mathematical precision was impossible but, as nearly as practicable, each
man's vote was required to carry the same weight. This decision, however, did not find its basis in the equal protection clause, but rather in
article I, section 2,82 of the United States Constitution.
Reynolds v. Sims8 3 and the five districting cases84 decided with it
on June 15, 1964, set down the meaning of equal protection as a standard governing the apportionment of state legislatures. The last apportionment of the Alabama legislature in Reynolds v. Sims occurred
shortly after 1900 and was based on the federal census of that year
despite the fact that the Alabama constitution required apportionment
decennially. The district court held this apportionment unconstitutional
on the basis of population inequalities, giving the legislature a period
of time to suggest a constitutional plan. Neither of the two plans suggested was, in the district court's view, wholly constitutional. It there79 Some examples are area representation, history, and representation of eco80 nomic interests.
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962) ; Sweeney v. Notte, 183
A. 2d 296 (R.I. 1962); Caesar v. Williams, 371 P. 2d 241 (Idaho 1962);
Israel, On Chartering A Course Through The Mathematical Quagmire: The
Future of Baker v. Carr,61 MicH. L. REv. 107 (1962) ; Bickel, The Durability
of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L. J. 39 (1962); McClosky, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962); Freud, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 631 (1964).
81376 U.S.1 (1964).
82 The pertinent part of article I, §2, reads as follows: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people
of the several states....." (Emphasis added.)
83 Note 2 supra.

84 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, supra note 1; Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S.

656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S.
695 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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fore took the best parts of both plans, combined them, and ordered
the 1962 elections held under this court-combined plan. 85
The Supreme Court approved the district court's decision. It held
that both houses of a state legislature must be apportioned on the basis
of substantial population equality among districts in order to afford
equal protection of the laws.86 Precise mathematical equality of population among districts, being impossible, was not required. So long as there
7
was substantial equality,8
certain deviations from strict population
equality might be allowed.
A state may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of
various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide
for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. 88
85 The new legislature, of course, was expected to enact a constitutional plan.

86 The substantial equality rule is based upon total population, not upon the

number of registered voters or upon the number of voters actually turning
out at the polls, or even upon the number of adults of voting age. It is conceivable, therefore, that the application of the population-based substantial
equality rule to districting plans will produce vote dilution in areas of high
population but low voter registration or low voter turnout at the polls, and
areas where the number of minors or others not qualified to vote is high.
Suppose, for example, District A, located in a southern state, has a population
of 40,000 people, consisting of 20,000 poorly educated Negroes, 8,000 cracker
whites, and 12,000 middle class whites. Approximately 12,000 voters annually
cast ballots in District A elections (2,000 Negroes and cracker whites and
10,000 middle class whites). District B, on the other hand, composed largely
of retired senior citizens, has a population of 20,000. Therefore, District B
in a population-based substantial equality apportionment has one-half the
number of state legislators allotted to District A. Approximately 15,000 voters
annually cast ballots in District B elections. John Citizen, a resident of District
B, finds that the value of his vote as one of District B's 15,000 votes is less
than one-half that of any one of District A's 12,000 voters.
A requirement that the substantial equality rule be based upon actual voter
turnout at the polls, voter registration, or adult population would call into
question provisions in many state constitutions requiring that the state legislature apportion according to the last federal census (e.g., WIs. CoNsT. art.
IV, §3). In practice, such provisions have been assumed to require apportionment based upon total population. Arguably, they might be interpreted
as merely requiring apportionment based upon population as evidenced by the
census. Then an apportionment based upon adult population or even voter
registration or turnout would not offend them. The United States Supreme
Court has not, as yet, discussed this problem. It is true that the Court in
Reynolds and its companion cases did compare existing apportionments with
total population. Arguably, at least, the Court in Reynolds was merely providing a test or yardstick against which an existing apportionment might be
measured. It was not, then, discussing the method by which substantial equality
should be achieved (method problems are raised by Mr. Chief Justice Warren
himself when he rejects rationality, etc.; see note 93 infra). If this is the case,
then it is open to the Court at a latter date to hold that an apportionment
achieved by the viethod of total population computation does not always
afford substantial equality of population. But see Ellis v. Mayor, 234 F. Supp.
945 (4th Cir. 1964).
87 The classification line, then, is to be drawn with the man and not the political
unit. Anything other than "one man, one vote," with certain specific and
minor exceptions, constitutes an unreasonable classification. See note 93 infra.
88 Reynolds v. Sims, supra dote 2, at 578. Maintaining the integrity of political
subdivision lines would not be so valid a consideration, the Court felt, in
congressional districting, as in state legislative apportionment cases.
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However, neither history, area representation, economic, or other group
interests are sufficient ends to justify deviation from strict population
equality, for "citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes."' 9
"Legislators represent people, not trees or acres." 90
Appellants in Reynolds alleged that the application of a substantial
equality standard in apportioning both houses of a state legislature
(thereby making the basis of representation in each house the same)
would render anachronistic the concept of bicameralism. This, the Court
stated, was untrue. A deliberate, mature consideration of legislative
proposals and the prevention of precipitate action upon them were, in
the Court's view, the principal goals of bicameralism., 1 These could be
achieved even though the entire legislature was elected on a population
basis. Bills could be required to pass both houses before becoming law.
The terms of members of one house as compared with those of the
other could be staggered. A certain area could be overrepresented in
one house and correspondingly underrepressented in the other.9 2 Finally,
the size of one house could be larger than the other, insuring in most
instances that members of both houses represent different size districts
and/or different group interests (economic, social, etc.).
Another argument advanced against the Reynolds rule was that it
vitiated the so-called "federal analogy." The United States was formed
when several sovereign states, through their duly appointed representatives, composed and assented to the federal constitution. The term
"federal analogy" means simply that these sovereign states would not
put a broader limitation upon their own powers (in the Constitution)
than that which they delegated to the federal government. Since Congress contains, by constitutional command, one house based solely on
population and one house based solely on political units (states), it can
be no less constitutional, it is argued, for a state legislature to contain
one house based on population and the other on political subdivisions
(e.g., counties). The Court rejected this argument as having no basis
in fact or theory. It noted that the system of representation in Congress
grew out of a dispute between the large and small states which threatened
to deadlock the constitutional convention. The large states wanted congressional representation based on population. The small states wanted
each state to receive the same number of representatives, no matter
how large or small it was. The present system of congressional representation (members of the House selected on a population basis; members of the Senate on the basis of statehood), therefore, represents a
89 Id.at 580.
90

Id. at 562.
91
92 Id. at 576.
Thirty-one days prior to the date upon which the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decisions in Reynolds and its companion cases, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied this principle in its court-drawn reapportionment of
Wisconsin. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 24.
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compromise among sovereign states. Without this compromise, they
would have conferred no sovereignty upon the federal government.
Counties (or other subdivisions of the state), on the other hand, confer
no sovereignty upon the state. They are mere creations of the state,
often subject to change or extinction at the legislature's will. The constitutional status of Congress, in the Court's view, therefore, did not
apply in this regard to state legislatures. 93 The Court's rejection of the
federal analogy strikes, perhaps, a fatal blow at the concept of dual
federalism and is an excellent example of the Court's adoption of the
philosophy of representative democracy.
Five of the six districting cases decided by the Supreme Court on
June 15, 1964, involved apportionments commanded or at least indirectly required by state constitutional provisions or formulas.94 This,
however, made no difference to the Court in adjudicating their compliance with the equal protection clause.
But it is also quite clear that a state legislative apportionment
scheme is no less violative of the Federal Constitution when it
is based on state constitutional provisions which have been consistently complied with than when resulting from a noncompliance with state constitutional requirements. When there is an
unavoidable conflict between the federal and a state constitution,
the supremacy clause of course controls. 95
Each of the five cases in question arose on appeal initially from a
federal district court. Nevertheless, it is practical to consider what
might happen if a case of this type were taken to a state supreme court.
Could the state supreme court invalidate a portion of its own constitution requiring unequal apportionment? Reynolds and its companion case indicate that it could. This view is based upon the supremacy
clause, article VI of the United States Constitution. This clause states,
in essence, that as between a state constitution and the federal constitution, the federal constitution is supreme, and that state judges must
by oath or affirmation promise to support the federal constitution.
Thus, it is argued, (by keeping this promise) a state court could in93 The Court noted that a state districting plan based upon the "federal analogy"
might be very rational and still be unconstitutional. The test of constitutionality under the equal protection clause is not rationality, but reasonable classification. A rational apportionment plan could very well contain an unreasonable classification. (This is one of the few areas in which the Court
has applied a near per se rule in the definition of what is a reasonable classification under the equal protection cause. In Brown v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 3, the Court laid down a per se rule defining reasonable classification in the area of race discrimination.) Anything other than "one man, one
vote," with certain specific and minor exceptions, constitutes an unreasonable
classification.
94 WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, supra note 1; Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly,
supra note 84; Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, supra note 84; Roman v. Sincock,
supra note 84; Reynods v. Sims, supra note 2. While general Alabama
constitutional provisions (in Reynolds) required population equality, other
specific provisions made the practical achievement of equality impossible.
95 Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 2, at 584.
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validate its own constitution. It is conceivable that a state court might
be reluctant to adopt this view.96 A state supreme court, after all, owes
its existence ultimately, at least, to the state constitution. It is a creation
of that document, an arm of the state, not the federal government,
unless the doctrine of dual federalism is dead. A state supreme court,
therefore, might contend that it exercises only the judicial power of
the state (not federal judicial power) and thus is powerless to invalidate the document from which it draws its powers. Such a decision
would probably evoke an attempted appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court could refuse to entertain the appeal
on the ground that what the state judicial power is, is a matter of state
law of which the state supreme court is the final arbiter.97 It is more
likely, however, that the Court would accept the appeal and overrule
the state court decision, basing its action upon the supremacy clause
argument of the Reynolds case. A determined state court might then
instruct its clerk not to file the Supreme Court's mandate (maintaining
that this was simply an indirect way of using its power to invalidate
the document which was the source of that power) as the Wisconsin
Supreme Court once did and did successfully. 9 Unless the superior
court's mandate is filed with the lower court, the lower court is not
overruled and its decision remains the law within its territorial jurisdiction. Appellants only remedy then would be to request a federal
court order holding someone in contempt. That someone could not be
the supreme court clerk, as he would have a perfect defense (i.e., had
he filed the mandate, he would have been in contempt of the state
supreme court). The contempt action could only be brought against
the supreme court justices themselves. Assuming but not asserting that
a contempt order could be effectively executed by the marshalls of one
court upon the members of another, if the state justices had the support
of the state legislature (so there was no impeachment and/or appointment of new justices), as likely they would, the contempt remedy
would be impractical and unworkable, as it would in large part effectively prevent dispensation of justice throughout the entire state. 99
96After

its judgment was vacated by the United States Supreme Court in

Scholla v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W. 2d 63 (1960), vacated and remanded,
369 U.S. 429 (1962), the Michigan Supreme Court, upon remand, held invalid
sections of its own constitution as violative of the equal protection principle
laid down in Baker. Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 178, 116 N.W. 2d 350 (1962).
97 The plaintiff's state court remedies would then be totally exhausted. He would
unquestionably be able to bring suit for the vindication of his federal right
in the federal district court of his area.
99 The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the Fugitive Slave Act of
September 18, 1850, was unconstitutional. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13 (1854). The
United States Supreme Court overruled and reversed the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, holding the Fugitive Slave Act constitutional. United States v. Booth,
62 U.S. 506 (1858). The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to file the United
States Supreme Court's mandate and the law in Wisconsin remained as
enunciated by its supreme court.
99 A large fine, rather than imprisonment, as a penalty for contempt might be
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One law review writer has suggested that all districting actions
should be brought first in the appropriate state court, and that until
it has refused to afford proper relief, federal courts should abstain
from deciding the issue. 100 This, it is argued, would enable state courts,
having an intimate kowledge of state affairs, to fashion the appropriate
remedy. It would also pay lip service to the doctrine of federalism. The
suggestion is a good one so long as the districting issue in dispute does
not involve an attack upon the state constitution. If it does, it would
probably be better to seek a judgment of unconstitutionality in the
federal court. One could then sue upon that judgment in the state court
to secure an appropriate remedy. 10 '
The apportionment plan invalidated in Lucas v. Colorado Gen.
Assembly, 1°2 a companion case to Reynolds, contained several unique
features not found in the five other districting cases. In the first place,
anyone prejudiced by the plan could secure its abolition through initiation of a referendum to that effect (provided a majority of the state's
voters agreed with him on the referendum). Such a referendum could
be initiated by anyone procuring signatures from only eight per cent
of those who actually voted for secretary of state in the last election.
There was, therefore, in Colorado an effective nonjudicial means to
secure relief for legislative malapportionment. This was of no importance, the Supreme Court declared. A person's legal rights may not
be denied in court simply because he possesses a remedy for their violation outside of court.
In the second place, the Colorado apportionment plan had been
approved by a majority of the Colorado electorate. The legislature
submitted that plan and a plan based solely on population to the people
in the form of a referendum. The plan adopted was selected by a sound
majority, including majorities in each allegedly malapportioned area.
This, the Supreme Court stated, was irrelevant. Constitutional rights
do not depend on majority vote. They are not creatures of majority
will. The Court's reasoning here can best be illustrated by example.
Suppose a majority of voters in the United States vote to disenfranchise a large minority. This process is continued with ever smaller
majorities until finally there are only three enfranchised voters, two
of whom vote to disenfranchise the other one. This could hardly be
termed constitutional or even democratic. Yet the majority will has
been followed in each instance.
The Court (in each of the six 1964 districting decisions) explicitly
a practical enforcement device. The text comments refer primarily to imprisonment for contempt.

100 Comment, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionment: A Problem of

Standards,72 YALE L. J. 968, 1030 (1962).
Note 84 supra.

101 It would, of course, be possible to secure a remedy in the federal court.
102
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refused to indicate what remedial devices it considered proper. Choices
of particular remedial techniques, it stated, would vary with the apportionment plan attacked and the local circumstances surrounding it. It
would be advisable, the Court felt, for a lower court, after holding a
districting act unconstitutional, to set aside a reasonable period of time
during which the state legislature might enact a constitutional apportionment. Only highly unusual circumstances, however, would justify
the lower courts allowing even one more election under the constitu03
tionally invalid apportionment act..
Prior state court districting law has been changed considerably by
the recent Supreme Court decisions. The presence of an unfair population formula in a state constitution is no longer an impediment to
judicial relief. All districting disputes are now justiciable. Contiguity
of territory is no longer a valid reason for deviating substantially from
population equality. While underrepresentation is still a prime concern,
any deviation from substantial population equality is taboo. A court
must do more than simply invalidate the offending act with the effect
of returning to the last act that was enforced and not specifically declared unconstitutional.
CongressionalReaction to the New Rule
The 1964 Supreme Court districting decisions quickly became as
04
controversial as Brown v. Board of Educ.1
State legislatures the
nation over faced the prospect of conversion from rural to urban and
suburban orientation. The impact of the Court's pronouncements was
felt in Congress as Senator Dirksen offered a rider'0 5 to the Foreign
Aid Bill. Dirksen's rider provided that "in the absence of highly unusual circumstances" any federal court (Supreme or lower) handling
an apportionment case must stay the granting of any relief for the
period necessary
(i) to permit any state election of representatives occurring
before January 1, 1966, to be conducted in accordance with the
laws of such state in effect immediately preceding any adjudication of unconstitutionality and
(ii) to allow the legislature of such state a reasonable opportunity in regular session or the people by constitutional
amendment a reasonable opportunity following the adjudication
103

If an election is imminent when the court's decision of unconstitutionality
is announced and the state's election machinery is already in progress, the
court might be justified in allowing the election under the invalid act. This
could be a highly unusual circumstance. There is nothing wrong, the Court
stated, with a state's adopting a periodic readjustment plan. A state constitution may provide that its legislature will reapportion every five years
or after each decennial federal census. If population inequalities arise before
that time, the state would not be required to reapportion earlier so long as
the total period between apportionments does not exceed ten years.

104 Note 3 supra.
105 Amendment to H.R. 11380, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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of unconstitutionality to apportion representation
in such legis10 6
lature in accordance with the Constitution.
The Supreme Court under the rider would be required to withhold its
hand in reviewing state court decisions, as well as federal.
The Dirksen rider has been criticized as an attempt to limit Supreme Court (and other federal court) jurisdiction of redistricting
disputes. Congress has several times in the past removed the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction of certain cases. 10 7 During Reconstruction days,
for example, the Supreme Court appeared likely to hold unconstitutional some of the provisions for military occupation of the South. In
1867, the Supreme Court held that it possessed jurisdiction over appeals from the circuit court on judgments in habeas corpus cases
arising under the Judicial Act of 1867.108 The particular case in which
this decision was made was then argued on the merits before the Court
and taken under advisement. This was the kind of case which, if
heard on the merits, would involve Reconstruction laws of dubious
constitutionality. Congress, therefore (while the case was awaiting
decision on the merits), passed a law (March 27, 1868) repealing that
provision of the Judicial Act of February 5, 1867, which authorized
appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the circuit court in
habeas corpus cases arising under it. When this law was pointed out
to the Court, it dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that it no
longer possessed requisite jurisdiction. 10 9 The Court held that its appellate jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution, but conferred
subject to "such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress
shall make." 110
[T]he Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both
as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make."'
Therefore, the Court stated in Ex parte McCardle,"2 Congress has a
constitutional right to remove parts of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Although McCardle has been criticized," 3 it has been consistently followed.

1 14

106 Ibid.
107 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868); Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S.

506 (1916) ; Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952).

108 Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318 (1867).
109 Ex parte McCardle, supra note 107.
110 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.

III Ibid.
112

Note 107 supra.

113 N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1964, p. 56, cols. 6-7; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
"1

U.S. 530, 605 n. 11 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
Missouri v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 292 U.S. 1, 15 (1934); Stephan v. United
States, 319 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1943); De La Roma Steamship Co. v. United
States, 344 U.S. 386, 390 (1953) ; Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra note 113, at 567
(majority opinion).
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The Dirksen rider did not fall within the purview of the McCardle
case. Contrary to certain of its critics, it did not attempt to remove or
linit Supreme Court (and other federal court) jurisdiction of redistricting disputes. It sought to
stay the entry or execution of any order interfering with the
conduct of the state government, the proceedings of any house of
the legislature thereof, or of any convention, primary, or election. ...115
The Dirksen rider, therefore, would have prevented federal courts
from granting any relief in cases dealing with the apportionment of
state legislatures (for the period of its application) .116 It would not
have prevented federal courts from taking jurisdiction of and adjudicating such cases.
Another objection raised against the Dirksen rider was that its
passage would have provided a precedent for congressional interference
with the national uniformity of constitutional rights. Constitutional
rights are uniform throughout the United States because the United
States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the final decisions
of the highest state court in cases dealing with the Constitution's interpretation. This principle was first enunciated by Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of Cohens v. Virginia."17 He traced the Supreme
Court's appellate power to article III, section 2, of the United States
Constitution, which gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
"all cases" arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States. Mr. Justice Marshall felt that the term "all cases" was
broad enough to include any case described within the constitutional
provision, in whatever lower court it might have been decided, state or
federal."3 The policy favors which motivated this ruling were aptly
stated by Mr. Justice Story in Martinv. Hunter's Lessee :"x9
Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might
differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States,
or even the constitution itself. If there were no revising authority
to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different
states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public
mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable; and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped
the enlightened convention which formed the constitution.
1.5 Amendment to H.R. 11380, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
'11 Dirksen's rider did not apply to congressional apportionment cases. Had it
been enacted, relief could have been granted in such cases under Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
1176 Wheat. 264 (1821).
218 Cohens v. Virginia, mipra note 117, at 416.
219 Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 1 Wheat. 303, 348 (1816).
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Mr. Justice Holmes expressed the same belief at a much later date:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several -states.120
The Dirksen rider, contrary to its critics, did not interfere with
the Supreme Court's constitutionally, protected power of assuring the
national uniformity of constitutional rights. In the first place, it did
not attempt to impair the Court's jurisdiction. It sought rather to curtail
(temporarily) the Court's power to grant relief. Therefore, had it been
enacted, the Dirksen rider would not have affected the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction over appropriate state court cases. It would not
have prevented the United States Supreme Court from reviewing upon
appeal an apportionment case decided by a state supreme court. In the
second place, even if the Dirksen rider had affected the Court's jurisdiction, it is doubtful that it could be termed unconstitutional as violative of the Cohens principle. The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state courts is conferred by article III, section 2, of the Constitution, which specifically states that Congress may make exceptions
to it. Finally, the Cohens case dealt with an attempt by the state of
Virginia to assert as a blanket proposition that the United States
Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction over state courts. The
Dirksen rider, had it been enacted, would have represented an attempt
by Congress, a national body, to limit the Court's relief-giving powers,
not generally, but as regards cases dealing with the apportionment of
state legislatures.
It appears, therefore, that the Dirksen rider was constitutional.
Whether politically Congress would have been wise to enact it is another matter.'

21

III.
THE WISCONSIN POSITION

Early in 1964, the Wisconsin Supreme Court revamped its state
districting law. In doing so it handed down a precedent-breaking decision which could well become a model for stat& districting cases
through the nation.121 The Wisconsin case was decided prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims and was based upon
120
121

122

and the Court, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
The Tuck Bill, H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), which would have
taken jurisdiction away from all federal courts in all districting cases, and
a resolution stating, in effect, that the sense of Congress was to give the
states sufficient time to adjust to the new apportionment rule, also failed to
pass the 88th Congress.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14. The court gave the
legislature a reasonable time to enact a constitutional reapportionment. When
it did not, the court drew up its own reapportionment plan in State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 24.
HOLMEs, Law
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the Wisconsin constitution, not the federal constitution. Still, it effectively presaged many of the commands and much of the advice given
in Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases. Continuing in this vein,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court on January 5, 1963, became the first court
to apply the rule of Reynolds v. Sims to a statewide county board ap23
portionment law.
The Wisconsin Court ReapportionmentPlan
The relator in State ex rel. Reynolds v.Zimmerman'-2 4 alleged that
the legislature had failed to obey its constitutional duty to reapportion
legislative districts after the 1960 federal census and that the existing
apportionment plan enacted in 1951 was invalid because of population
inequalities. He urged the court to mandamus the respondent, Robert
Zimmerman, Secretary of State, to hold the 1964 elections either according to a court drawn apportionment plan or at large.
In June 1963, senate bill 575, S., attempting to reapportion Wisconsin legislative districts, passed both houses of the legislature but was
vetoed by Governor Reynolds. His veto was not overridden. Shortly
thereafter (August, 1963), the legislature passed Joint Resolution 49,
which purported to reapportion Wisconsin's legislative districts. Joint
Resolution 49 was substantially similar to 575, S. As it was a joint
resolution, however, it did not require gubernatorial consent, or passage
over the Governor's veto by a two-thirds majority in the event he
failed to consent. Respondent asserted that Joint Resolution 49 was a
valid apportionment and that he would call the 1964 elections under it
unless the court should invalidate it. In the event Joint Resolution 49
was invalidated by the court, respondent stated, he would call the 1964
elections under the Districting Act of 1954, the so-called Rosenberry
plan, unless directed otherwise by the court.
John Reynolds, the court held, had standing to bring suit in his
official capacity as Governor.125 Joint Resolution 49, in the court's view,
was not an apportionment act at all as it was passed without the Governor's consent or veto. The one political institution representative of the
totality of state voters having a place in the legislative process is the
executive office, headed by the Governor. The court felt that the Wisconsin constitution placed heavy emphasis upon the requirement that
legislative districts be apportioned "according to the number of inhabitants."'-2 6 This goal could be more readily realized if an officer
123
124

State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, supra note 12.

Note 14 supra.

125 See p. 518 & note 14 supra. Technically, Reynolds had standing simply to continue suit, although the court specifically states he had standing to bring
suit. On the facts, Reynolds initiated the suit in question when he was attorney general and continued it when he became Governor, as the new
attorney general refused to continue it.
126 WIS. CONST. art. IV, §3. This particular provision of the Wisconsin constitution gave rise to the court's population-based per capita equality rule.
See pp. 544 & 545 infra. Thus the court's finding that the Governor is an esen-
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responsible to all of those inhabitants played some part in the selection
of an apportionment plan. Therefore, the court reasoned, the constitution's framers intended to include the Governor in the reapportionment process . 7 Possibly the court was influenced to adopt this
position by the fact that Governor Reynolds belonged to one political
party, and the majority of the state legislature to another. Respondent
argued that the constitution might be amended or a referendum submitted to the people by the legislature without the Governor's consent.
This argument, the court noted, was irrelevant. In both situations presented by respondent the voting majority (as well as minority) expressed their will directly at the polls. There was, however, no need
for them to speak through the Governor as there would be in a redistricting situation.
Respondent urged that a textual analysis of the constitution supported his contention that the Governor was not a necessary part of
the state legislative reapportionment process. The constitutional provision requiring state legislative districting reads: "[T]he legislature
shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly"'"" (emphasis added), while the provision relating to congressional districting states:
Two members of congress shall also be elected .

.

. and until

otherwise provided by law, the counties [named] shall constitute
the first congressional district, and elect one member ....
129
(Emphasis added.)
Respondent pointed out that article V, section 10, of the constitution
provides that "every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor.. .

."

(Emphasis

added.) He argued, therefore, that omission of the term "law" in the
provision governing state legislative districting indicated that the constitutional framers intended to allow the legislature to reapportion itself
without the Governor if it chose to do so. The court noted that article
IV of the constitution, dealing with legislative powers, contains many
sections "providing that 'the legislature shall' discharge some substantive function of government."' 130 Many of these functions, it stated,
were of the very essence of government. Certainly respondent could not
contend that the omission of the term "law" in these provisions meant
that the legislature could act under them by resolution. Provisions suptial part of the reapportionment process is directly related to the court's finding that reapportionment must be based upon per capita population equality
among districts.
127 The provisions of Wis. CoNsT. art. V., §10 (requiring the Governor's consent
or passage over his veto by a two-thirds majority), therefore, apply to reapportionment legislation.
128 Note 126 supra.
129

WIs. CONsT. art. XIV, §10.

130 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 554-55, 126 N.W. 2d
at 557-58.
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porting the court's point in that they confer power upon the legislature
without mention of the term "law" appear in article III ("Suffrage"),' 3'
article VII ("Judiciary"),132 article VIII ("Finance"),13' article X
("Education") ,'1 34 article XI ("Corporations"),' 35 article XIII ("Mis' 31 WIs. CONST. art. III, §1: "Every person, of the age of twenty-one years or
upwards belonging to either of the following classes, who shall have resided
in the state for one year next preceding any election, and in the election
district where he offers to vote such time as may be prescribed by the legislature ... shall be deemed a qualified elector... ." (Emphasis added.)
132 WIs. CONST. art. VII, §2: "The legislature may also vest such jurisdiction
as may be deemed necessary in municipal courts, and shall have power to
establish inferior courts ....
[T]he legislature shall provide as well for the
election of judges of the municipal courts as of judges of inferior courts.
.. " (Emphasis added.)
Wis. CoNST. art. VII, §6: "The legislature may alter the limits or increase
the number of circuits, making them as compact and convenient as practicable.
... " (Emphasis added.)

WIs. CONST. art. VII, §7: "[T]he legislature may . . . authorize additional
circuit judges to be chosen ...*"

(Emphasis added.)

WIs. CONST. art. VII, §10: "Each of the judges of the supreme and circuit
courts shall receive a salary, payable at such time as the legislature shall
fix ...

."

(Emphasis added.)

Wis. CONsT. art. VII, §11: "And the legislature may provide for holding
other terms and at other places... !' (Emphasis added.)
WIs. CONST. art. VII, §14: [T]he legislature shall have power to abolish
the office of judge of probate in any county .. " (Emphasis added.)
Wis. CoNsT. art. VII, §15: "The electors ... shall ... as the legislature may
direct, elect justices of the peace.... [T]heir number and classification shall
be regulated by law." (Emphasis added.)
Wis. CoNsT. art. VII, §18: "The legislature shall impose a tax on all civil
suits. ... " (Emphasis added.)
J 'IS. CoNST. art. VII, §23: "The legislature may provide for the appointment
.... " (Emphasis added.)

WIs. CONsT. art. VII, §24: "[He shall] serve temporarily as a circuit judge
and shall be compensated as the legislature provides." (Emphasis added.)
133 WIs. CoNsT. art. VIII, §1: The legislature may empower cities, villages or
towns to collect and return taxes on real estate. . .

."

(Emphasis added.)

Wis. CONST. art. VIII, §5: "The legislature shall provide for an annual
tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state ....
[W]henever
the expenses of any year shall exceed the income, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax ...

sufficient . . . to pay the deficiency ...

"

(Em-

phasis added.)
Wis. CoNsT. art. VIII, §7: "The legislature may also borrow money. .
(Emphasis added.)
WIs. CONST. art. VIII, §8: "On the passage in either house of the legislature of any law which imposes, continues or renews a tax . . . the question
shall be taken by yeas and nays, which shall be duly entered on the journal;
and three-fifths of all the members elected to such house shall in all such
cases be required to constitute a quorum therein." (Emphasis added.)
Would respondent contend, therefore, that if the legislature levied a
tax under §5 it could do so without the Governor, without a recording of
yeas and nays, and with less than three-fifths of its elected members present,
whereas if it chose to levy that same tax under §8 it could not do so without
gubernatorial participation, without recording yeas and nays, and without
a quorum of three-fifths of its elected members?
134 WIs. CONST. art. X, §1: "The supervision of public instruction shall be
vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature
shall direct; and their qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall
be prescribed by law." (Emphasis added.)
135 WIs. CoNsT. art. XI, §3: "Cities and villages ...
are . . . empowered, to determine their local affairs and government, subject only . . . to such enactments of the legislature.. " (Emphasis added.)
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cellaneous Provisions") 136 and article XIV ("Schedule"). 1 37 The legislature has in the past exercised these powers through the enactment of
law, either with the Governor's consent or over his veto.
The court buttressed its argument as to the necessity of the Governor's participation in the reapportionment process by resorting to the
doctrine of practical construction. Every prior apportionment in Wisconsin's history has been accomplished through the joint efforts of the
legislature and the Governor in passing and signing into law a particular reapportionment bill. This, the court felt, indicated that both the
legislative and executive branches of its state government had long
recognized the necessity of gubernatorial participation in reapportionment.' 38 The long standing view of the political branches of government as to the scope of their authority in issues relating to the relative
power of coordinate branches of government, the court stated, is of
great weight when a court must make a judicial determination of the
scope of that authority." 9 Thus, Joint Resolution 49, formulated and
perfected without participation by the Governor, was no apportionment
at all.140 Since it was not even formally speaking an apportionment, its
constitutional merits as an apportionment measure were not before the
court.
Since it was not superseded by Joint Resolution 49, the Rosenberry
plan, passed by the legislature and signed by the Governor into law in
1951, was Wisconsin's apportionment law. As such, it was before the
court on its constitutional merits.
The court indicated that the Wisconsin constitution requires "per
capita equality of representation"'4' (emphasis added) among Wis136

Wis. CONST. art. XIII, §9: "All county officers ... shall be elected . . . or

appointed ... as the legislature shall direct. All city, town, and village officers
... as in the legislature shall designate ... ." (Emphasis added.)
WIs. CoNsT. art. XIII, §10: "The legislature may declare the cases in which

any office shall be deemed vacant, and also the manner of filling the vacancy .. " (Emphasis added.)

13 Wis. CoNsT. art. XIV, §2: "All laws now in force in the territory of Wiscon-

sin ...

shall remain in force until . . . altered or repealed by the legislature."

(Emphasis added.)

WIs. CONsT. art. XIV, §7: "All county, precinct and township officers shall

continue to hold their respective offices . . .until the legislature shall provide
for the holding of elections...." (Emphasis added.)
WIs. CONsT. art. XIV, §13: "Such parts of the common law as are now in

force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution,
shall be and continue part of the law of this state until altered or suspended
by the legislature." (Emphasis added.)
138 The Wisconsin court in an earlier case held that the Governor's participation

in reapportionment was necessary and that this was shown from history.
State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, supra note 38, at 407, 52 N.W. 2d at
908.
139 To substantiate this point the court cited the following cases: Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ; Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
140 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 553-59, 126 N.W. 2d
at 557-59.
'4' Id.
at 564, 126 N.W. 2d at 562.
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consin's legislative districts. The precise constitutional provision upon
which the court grounded its position reads as follows:
At their first session after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and
district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according
to the number of inhabitants, excluding Indians not taxed, soldiers, and officers of the United States army and navy. 14 2 (Emphasis added.)
The force of this constitutional provision is limited, the court noted, in
only two ways. In the first place, absolute mathematical equality, being
impossible, is not required.'" In the second place, per capita equality
of representation, being a constitutional requirement, is limited by other
specific constitutional restrictions upon it.'14 There are only three such
restrictions. Assembly districts must be bounded by county, precinct,
town, or ward lines,' 45 and senate districts must consist of whole assembly districts.14 6 Certain governmental lines, therefore, are to be held
inviolable in the formation of assembly and senate districts. Assembly
districts, for example, may consist of one county, several counties, or
a portion of one county, but never one county plus a portion of another,
or portions of several counties. The second constitutional restriction
upon the per capita equality principle is the requirement of compactness of territory,'1 47 and the third is the requirement of contiguity of
142 Note 126 supra.
143 State ex tel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 566, 126 N., r. 2d

at 563.

144 Ibid.
145 WIs. CONST. art. IV, 4.
146 WIs. CONsT. art. IV, §5.

The term "precinct" as used in the constitution
is ambiguous in that it is susceptible of two meanings. Two Wisconsin cases

have suggested that it referred to the area around a polling place inhabited
by those who voted at that polling place. State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Cunningham, supra note 7, at 520; Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Oconto, 50 Wis.
189, 196, 6 N.W. 607, 609 (1880). In Cunningham the court stated: "When
the constitution was adopted, the optional township system of government,
enacted in 1841, did not prevail in several counties of the territory of Wisconsin. Those counties were divided into precincts,--mainly for election
purposes,-each of which correspond in some respects to the town or ward
of other counties. But the precinct of the constitution disappeared when the
uniform system of town and county government prescribed by the con-

stitution [article IV, §23] became fully operative."
It has been argued with some merit that the term "precinct" should be

interpreted differently. Under the Oconto-Cunninghan; interpretation the
word "precinct" as used in the constitution became obsolete or meaningless
almost with the passage of the constitution. Meaningless words, it has been
urged, are not placed in constitutions. Therefore, the term "precinct" should
be given its ordinary or commonly understood meaning, i.e., a subdivision

of a ward or of a town. Brief for the Racine County Republican Party as

Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-4, State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 24.
147 The court in, State ex el. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 566,
126 N.W. 2d at 563, appears to consider only the integrity of governmental
boundaries as a precise constitutional restriction. Still, when it actually reapportions the state in State ex tel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 24,
at 606-07, 128 N.W. 2d at 17, it specifically states that it could have achieved
greater per capita equality of population had it not made allowances for
compactness of territory. Compactness of territory is required by the same
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territory. 148 It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme
Court in Reynolds v. Sims 49 specifically and perhaps exclusively cited
these three restrictions as legitimate deviations from the strict population equality standard. Although justifying a deviation from strict population equality, the existence of one of these restrictions according to
the United States Supreme Court would not justify a deviation from
substantial population equality.150 Whether the Wisconsin Supreme
Court would have permitted a substantial deviation from per capita
equality of representation in the name of one of these restrictions is
an open question. 51 Certainly, it could not now do so consistent with
the federal constitution.
Underrepresentation throughout the state under the Rosenberry
plan was substantial. The largest senate district was 73.9 percent greater
than the ideal district, and the smallest senate district was 38 percent
less than the ideal district.'15 The largest assembly district was 121.3
percent greater than the ideal district, and the smallest assembly district was 50.3 percent less than the ideal district.' 5 ' Deviations from the
ideal in many of the other districts were equally substantial. 5 4 The court
ruled, therefore, that the Rosenberry plan, Wisconsin's apportionment
law, was unconstitutional as it did not comport with the per capita
equality of representation standard.
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, by invalidating the Rosenberry plan, 155 overruled holdings in the Martin5 6 and Broughton'57
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provisions of the Wisconsin constitution as are the boundary line restrictions
(article IV, §4, for the assembly and article IV, §5, for the senate).
Like compactness of territory, contiguity of territory is apparently excluded
as a precise constitutional restriction in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 566, 126 N.W. 2d at 563. Contiguity of territory, however, like compactness of territory, is required by the same constitutional
provisions that require integrity of governmental boundaries (article IV,
§4, for the assembly and article IV, §5, for the senate). The court could have
avoided the Calumet County problem discussed at p. 554 infra if contiguity of
territory was no restriction, by simply forming a single assembly district out
of Calumet County and some other noncontiguous county.
Note 2 supra, at 578-81.

Court states in Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 2, at 578: "[T]o do so
would be constitutionally valid, so long as the resulting apportionment was
one based substantially on population and the equal-population principle was
not diluted in any significant way."
1' This statement is made with reference to the Rosenberry plan (a legislative enactment). A discussion of the application of these restrictions in the
court's own apportionment plan and their (federal) constitutional implications follows in the text.
152 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 24, at 625 (chart in appendix), 128 N.W. 2d at 26.
153Ibid.
154 19 assembly
districts were more than 18 percent greater than the ideal
assembly district, and 7 senate districts were more than 18 percent greater
than the ideal senate district. Ibid.
155 The Rosenberry plan was declared constitutional in State ex rel. Broughton
v. Zimmerman, supra note 38, and State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264
Wis. 644, 60 N.W. 2d 416, 61 N.W. 2d 300 (1953).
15OThe
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State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, supra note 38.

157 State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, supra note 38.

19651

COMMENTS

cases to the effect that an apportionment plan constitutional in its inception could not become unconstitutional simply because of shifts in
population over the passage of time. The court could see no distinction
between a plan which, when enacted and applied immediately,
denies per capita equality of representation and a plan which
though valid when enacted, denies per capita equality of representation when applied some years later after substantial shifts
in population have occurred. At the moment the court considers
the constitutionality of either plan, the denial of the constitutional right has the same magnitude."51
Would the converse of this proposition also be true? In other words,
could an apportionment unconstitutional in its inception become constitutional simply because of shifts in population over a period of time?
Suppose, for example, the legislature enacts a flagrant gerrymander. 5 9
Stalling techniques are then utilized. Population shifts occur, so that
when the apportionment plan is considered by the court it meets the
constitutional tests. It appears, under State ex rel. Reynolds reasoning,
that this plan would be upheld. At the moment the court considers the
apportionment plan in question, the constitutional right it affirms has
the same magnitude as it would had the plan been constitutional in its
inception. It might be argued that a plan constitutional in its inception
is existent law which could over the passage of time become unconstitutional, whereas a plan unconstitutional in its inception is a nullity.
It is easier for something to become nothing than for nothing to become
something.
It is, nevertheless, an astonishing legal proposition that a law specifically declared constitutional under a given constitution could become
unconstitutional at a later point in time under that same constitution
without overruling the initial determination of constitutionality. Perhaps, what the court meant to accomplish by its holding on this point
was a condemnation of legislative inaction in the face of a constitutional duty to act, by abolishing the old state court rule that an apportionment valid in its inception remained so until the legislature enacted
another valid apportionment supplanting it. Then, any constitutional
rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 562, 563, 126 N.V. 2d
at 562.
159 If a state constitution requires, as does Wisconsin's, that only one valid
apportionment may be made every ten years (one per federal census), it
appears that the legislature could allow for reasonably expected population
trends, at least up to mid-point in that ten year period, when drawing its
apportionment plan. The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated
that a state constitution may limit the number of legislative apportionments
so long as it permits at least one apportionment per ten year period, even
though population inequality occurs during that period. See note 103 supra.
If population shifts or increases can be expected during that period, an apportionment plan reflecting them would seem in harmony with the one man,
one vote principle.
158 State ex
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apportionment would automatically expire (become invalid) at the first
session of the legislature after the next federal census.
If this was what the court meant, the language it used was too
weak. From the court's language, although admittedly ambiguous, it
would appear that an apportionment law remains valid until successfully challenged in court or supplanted by the legislature. It would
appear further that even though a federal census had passed since its
enactment and the legislature had failed to reapportion, an apportionment law would be sustained upon challenge so long as it met the constitutional tests of per capita population equality, compactness, and contiguity of territory, and did not violate the integrity of county, town,
or ward lines. It seems also that immediately after a federal census
and prior to the completion of the first legislative session thereafter,
a plaintiff who possessed standing to sue could seek a declaratory
judgment that the existing apportionment law was unconstitutional,
even though the court would have to wait until the completion of the
first legislative session following such census before taking remedial
action.

160

Perhaps the court's language upon this point was deliberately loose
and ambiguous. The court wanted to find the Rosenberry plan unconstitutional. Yet, it had been specifically declared constitutional in two
prior cases. 61' The logical resolution of this difficulty would have been
a holding that each apportionment plan expires automatically after a
new federal census. The court, however, may have wished to avoid the
legal consequences of such a rule."' Its somewhat confusing holding,
therefore, that an apportionment law specifically declared constitutional
could by shifts in population over the mere passage of time become
unconstitutional might be explained as the use of a convenient escape
valve.
State ex rel. Reynolds overruled Martin and Broughton in another
respect. The Martin and Broughton cases held, in accord with general
pre-Baker state court law, that a court could grant no affirmative relief
in apportionment cases. Thus, judicial relief was limited to an invalidation of the offending act or acts provided, of course, that there was
some prior act not specifically declared unconstitutional.' 6' Returning
to the philosophy of the early Cunningham cases,' 6 4 the court in State
160

The supreme court of course, could decline to exercise its original jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the action was brought in a circuit court, it seems
the circuit court would have to take the case.

161 Note 155 supra.

If, for example, the first session of the legislature after each federal census,
could not pass a reapportionment law, the court would be compelled to reapportion the state even though the prior apportionment law filled all the
constitutional requisites.
163 For a detailed analysis of pre-Baker state court remedies, see pp. 523-525 supra.
164 State ex reL. Lamb v. Cunningham, supra note 11. In State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 484, 51 N.W. at 730, the court
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ex rel. Reynolds found it had the power to grant affirmative relief. Aside
from the courts, the only place to obtain redress for an apportionment
wrong is in the electoral process. The court felt that that avenue of
redress was closed when the wrong complained of was the corruption
of the electoral process itself.' 65 The only remedy for vote dilution was
judicial. If the constitutional mandate of per capita equality in representation was to be enforced at all, the court had to have the power to
fashion an affirmative apportionment remedy.
Once a court decides it has the power to grant an affirmative remedy,
the question arises as to which affirmative remedy should be employed.
The United States Supreme Court has refused for the present, at least,
to discuss the appropriateness of any particular affirmative remedy. 166
Certainly no state court would attempt directly to mandamus a state
legislature to pass a constitutional act. 6 7 There are three affirmative
remedies frequently offered as means by which this result might be
indirectly effected. They are: elections at large, a system of weighted
voting, and a temporary court-drawn districting plan.
Elections at large as a remedy for legislative malapportionment
raise serious questions under the United States Constitution. In an
election at large, each state legislator runs throughout the entire state,
not simply a particular district. Those who win are those who, like the
victorious gubernatorial candidate, receive a majority of the state's
votes. The political party, therefore, which controls a majority of the
state's voters in a given election is likely to elect almost all of its candidates. The other parties, no matter how strong their minorities, are
likely to elect few, if any, representatives to either of the state's legislative houses. Suppose, for example, State A has 100 assemblymen.
Party B, whose adherents number about 38 percent of the state's population, regularly elects 30 assemblymen. John Citizen votes for Party B's
candidates in an election at large. Party B gets 38 percent of the vote
and elects none of its candidates. John Citizen could argue that the
weight of his vote has been diluted in violation of the equal protection
clause. 168 He certainly is seriously underrepresented, in that before,

165

stated: "[T]here should be as close an approximation to exactness as possible,
and this is the utmost limit for the exercise of legislative discretion."
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 564, 126 N.W. 2d
at 562.

166 See pp. 536-537 supra.
167 Whether a federal court could directly mandamus a state legislature to per-

form its duty has not yet been decided. The United States Supreme Court

in Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 603-06 (1918), suggested the
possibility of a federal court doing this, but specifically refused to decide

whether it possessed the power to do so. Whether or not a federal court
could issue such a mandamus, practical difficulties would make it highly
inadvisable to do so.
168 John Citizen might allege in the alternative that the republican form of
government clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4) has been violated. This clause
has been held to raise a political question. Luther v. Borden, 17 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849). Nevertheless, it appears today that at least some cases
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30 assemblymen advocated his beliefs, now none do. ,One method which
has been suggested as a means of avoiding infringement of minority
rights (violating the fourteenth amendment) in an election at large is
to limit the number of candidates either party may run on its slate to
a percentage of the total number of legislators to be elected. 16 State A,
for example, having a total of 100 assembly seats, might prohibit any
party from running more than 66 candidates. This would assure the
election of at least 34 persons who were not members of the majority
party. This device limits the voter's ability to select the candidate of
his choice. The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on its
constitutionality.
Elections at large create underrepresentation in another way, at
least arguably violative of the equal protection clause. A legislator
elected at large is answerable to all the voters of the state, just as is
the Governor, not to the voters of a particular district. Therefore,
whatever party he belongs to, he is likely to represent only those interests which have state-wide appeal.'7 A majority party voter, therefore, to the extent his interests are local, might find the value of his
vote diluted.
In Wisconsin there is no need for the court to consider whether
elections at large as a remedy violate the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution or even the per capita equality standard of the
Wisconsin constitution. The Wisconsin constitution expressly requires
that state senators' 71 and assemblymen' 2 be elected "by single districts."
Elections at large, therefore, would appear to violate Wisconsin's constitution.
Some political scientists have advocated a system of weighted voting
as a remedy for legislative malapportionment.1'7 A court applying this
remedy would leave the legislative districts as they are under the unconstitutional apportionment act. It would affix a weight to each legislator's vote which would bear the same relation to the total number of
members in his legislative house as the population of his district bears
to the total population of the state. Thus, one state senator might have
arising under it would be held to present a justiciable controversy. Baker
v. Carr, supra note 2, at 686-88, especially n. 48.
169 The 1964 elections of members to the Illinois House of Representatives were
held at large. This was pursuant to a specific command in the Illinois constitution. People ex rel. Spence v. Carpentier, 30 Ill. 2d 43, 195 N.E. 2d 690 (1964).
People ex rel. Daniels v. Carpentier, 30 Ill. 2d 590, 198 N.E. 2d 514 (1964),
held that minority rights under the fourteenth amendment were adequately
protected since the Illinois legislature prohibited any political party from
presenting a slate of candidates totaling more than two-thirds of the total
number of representatives to be elected.
170 The device suggested in note 169 supra would not dissolve this objection
to the constitutionality of elections at large.
171

Note 146 rupra.

145 supra.
1 Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L. J. 64, 78 (1962),
Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 18, 161 A. 2d 705, 714 (1960).
172 Note
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1Y2 votes and another three-fourths of a vote. This remedy could conceivably impair the work of the legislature. Problems would arise as
to the allocation of speaking time and the appointment of committee
members. The Wisconsin constitution places certain limitations upon
the court's ability to use this remedy. In order to override the Goverernor's veto, the constitution requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present in both houses, not two-thirds of the weighted votes. 4 In
order to compel a recording in the house journal of those voting for
and those against when a vote is taken, the constitution requires a request by one-sixth of those present, not one-sixth of the weighted
votes. 17 5 Constitutional amendments must be agreed to by a majority
of the members of two successive legislatures, not by a majority of the
weighted vote.17 6 A majority of each house, according to the constitution, shall constitute a quorum, not, apparently, a majority of the
weighted vote. 77 No court, state or federal, has used this remedy.
The Wisconsin court in State ex rel. Reynolds, apparently aware
of their deficiencies, did not even discuss elections at large or weighted
voting as potential remedies. Instead, it announced that unless the legislature with the Governor's participation passed a constitutional apportionment within two months (by May 1, 1964), it would district
the state itself. No apportionment was enacted during the two months
allotted by the court for that purpose. The court, therefore, drew up
its own districting plan and ordered the secretary of state to call elections under it until such time as the legislature passed a constitutional
apportionment act.
Problems Created by the Wisconsin CourtReapportionmentPlan
This court drawn districting plan gives rise to a variety of problems. A court's power is judicial, not legislative. 78 A court decree
which in every other way possesses the character and form of a legislative act (whose passage is required of the legislature by the constitution) could only be justified as an exercise of judicial rather than
a usurpation of legislative power on the ground that it is (unlike the
action of the legislature) provisional. A court-drawn apportionment is
certainly such a decree. If this particular remedy must be provisional,
it could be argued that the court in State ex rel. Reynolds should have
made its districting plan effective only until the next election of the
legislature is completed instead of until the legislature passes a constitutional plan. This argument has much theoretical merit. It is dif'.4
.75

'17
3.7

178

WIs. CONsT. art. V, §10.
WIS. CoNsT.

art. IV, §20.

WIS. CONsT. art. XI, §1.
WIs. CoNsT. art. IV, §7. Many other provisions require a vote by a certain
percentage of the vrembers of the legislature, such as: art. VII, §13; art. XI,

§4; art. VIII, §8.

WIs. CoNsT. art. VII, §2; U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
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ficult to view as provisional a court decree which could exist as long
as the legislative act which it supplants.1 9 As a practical matter, however, the court was probably wise in making its remedy effective until
the legislature passes a constitutional plan. It is possible that the legislative majority (in at least one house) will continue to represent one
party and the Governor another. In this event, unless the court's plan
remains effective as a stimulus to legislative action, another stalemate
between the legislature and the Governor on the reapportionment issue
might occur. Should such a stalemate occur, further costly and time
consuming litigation might be necessary to determine what redistricting
plan to call the next elections under.
The Wisconsin constitution requires that the state be reapportioned
after each federal census. 80 If the first session of the legislature thereafter fails to produce a constitutional reapportionment, the legislative
duty continues in each succeeding session until a constitutional reapportionment law is enacted.' 8 ' Once such a reapportionment is enacted,
the state may not again be reapportioned until the next federal census. 8 2 The constitution, then, permits one and only one redistricting
per federal census. The court in State ex rel. Reynolds constitutionally
redistricted the state. Does this court drawn reapportionment constitute
the one constitutionally permissible reapportionment and effectively
prevent the legislature from enacting its own reapportionment to supplant the courts until the next federal census? The provision of the
Wisconsin constitution which has been interpreted as limiting the number of reapportionments to one per federal census states that "the
legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate
and assembly.'' 1 3 (Emphasis added.) It could be argued, therefore,
that the constitution commands the legislature to reapportion once per
federal census. If the only apportionment following a federal census
is a court reapportionment, the legislature, it appears, would still be
entitled to one reapportionment.
It seems likely that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, if called upon
to adjudicate the matter, would adopt this point of view.18 4 The court
the legislature should fail to pass a valid reapportionment, the court's
plan would remain in effect until, at least, the next federal census was completed. At this time it would be possible to bring a new action asking the
court to reapportion the state again on the ground that its plan had become
unconstitutional by reason of population inequalities arising after the plan
was put into effect.

179 If

180 Note 126 supra.

181 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, supra note 7.
1s2

183
184

Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 444 (1861); State ex rel. Thomson v.
Zimmerman, supra note 155, at 661; State ex rel. Smith v. Zimmerman, 266
Wis. 307, 312-13, 63 N.W. 2d 52, 56 (1954).
Note 126 supra.
Slauson v. City of Racine, supra note 182, is the initial case construing the
constitution to allow but one apportionment per federal census. The court
in that case did not explicitly state whether one apportionment means one
legislative apportionment or one apportionment (of any kind). However,
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stated in State ex rel. Reynolds that its districting plan was to be
effective only until the legislature passed a constitutionally permissible
apportionment act. If the court meant by this that its plan was effective
at least until after the next federal census because another reapportionment was not permitted by the constitution until then, the court's reapportionment would necessarily be effective for as long a period of
time as any reapportionment by the legislature could be. Such a remedy
could by no stretch of the imagination be termed provisional. If the
court's districting plan in State ex rel. Reynolds is not provisional, it
is an exercise of legislative (not judicial) power as it bears all the
marks of a legislative act.8 5 The court in State ex rel. Reynolds specifically stated that its remedy was provisional. 8 6 It apparently recognized, therefore, that the existence of the court-drawn reapportionment
plan would not impair the enactment of a constitutional reapportionment plan by the legislature prior to the next federal census.
One of the briefs filed with the court to assist it in drawing its
reapportionment plan urged that Milwaukee County be given 26 as18 7
sembly seats in place of the 24 it possessed under the Rosenberry plan.
The court decided to give Milwaukee County 25 seats. Perhaps one of
the reasons Milwaukee was not given 26 seats was that in order to do
so the court would have had to redraw city of Milwaukee ward lines.
Normally Milwaukee's ward lines, 8 like those of any other Wisconsin city, 8 9 are changed by an ordinance of its common council.
Nevertheless, if the legislature chose to do so, it would undoubtedly
have the power to redraw Milwaukee's ward lines.190 It could be
argued, therefore, that if the legislature did not change Milwaukee's
ward lines and thereby created or permitted an apportionment which
failed to meet the standard of per capita equality of representation, a
court which possesses the power to draw up its own provisional reapportionment possesses the power to insure its constitutionality by
changing Milwaukee's ward lines.
On the other hand, a court might feel that a certain amount of
judicial restraint is necessary in reapportionment disputes. Somewhere
there is a line between the exercise of judicial and legislative power in
court reapportionment cases. It could be argued that it has been crossed
when governmental boundary lines are tampered with in setting up
in a later case, State ex rel. Smith v. Zimmerman, supra note 182, the court
stated: "It is now settled that, without a constitutional change permitting it,
no more than one legislative apportionment may be made in the interval
between two federal enumerations." (Emphasis added.)
185 See pp. 551 & 552 supra.
1s6 Note 14 supra,at 571, 126 N.W. 2d at 566.
Relator's Apportionment Plans, pp. 1-19, Exhibit XIX, pp. 1-26.
WIS., CITY CHARTER ANN. 4 (1914).
L89WIS. STAT. §62.08 (1) (1963).

287

188 MILWAUKEE,

190 See State ex rel. Neacy v. City of Milwaukee, 150 Wis. 616, 138 N.W. 76
(1912).
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legislative districts. If ward lines may be changed in affording a more
equitable reapportionment, then county lines may be changed as well.
The fact that county boundaries are set up by legislative statute' 9 '
does not adequately distinguish them in this regard from ward boundaries, as statutes which are unconstitutional can be invalidated by the
court.
The court's reapportionment plan in State ex rel. Reynolds allocated to Calumet county one assembly seat even though its population
is 17,260 less than that of the ideal assembly district. Assembly districts under the Wisconsin constitution may consist of one county,
several entire counties, or a portion of one county, but never one county
plus a portion of another or portions of several counties. 192 By historical
accident, it is impossible to join Calumet County to any of the entire
counties surrounding it without creating an assembly district so large
as to produce substantial underrepresentation. Seeking to avoid underrepresentation, the court felt compelled to overrepresent Calumet County
rather substantially. It was, indeed, compelled to do so if it did not
possess the power to alter county lines. If it did possess such power,
a far more equitable reapportionment could have been made by the
simple extension of Calumet County's boundaries at the expense of
one or more of its neighboring counties. 193 Such a reapportionment, if
within the court's power, would appear to have been required by the
standard of per capita equality of representation.
The United States Supreme Court has, as yet, had no occasion to
consider this problem. If the Reynolds' rule is to be interpreted
literally, a court would be required to redraw county or ward lines if
no other means could be found by which to achieve substantial equality
of population among districts. It is, however, still open to the court
to find that the alteration of governmental lines involves an exercise
of legislative rather than judicial power. This problem, moreover, might
in most instances be avoided by a simple finding that the lower court
achieved substantial population equality without redrawing governmental lines.
Some memoranda filed with the court to assist it in reapportioning Wisconsin urged the court to lower the number of assemblymen
from 100 to 98 and the number of state senators from 33 to 31.195
The court did not do this, as it settled upon a plan affording substantial
population equality without altering the number of legislative repre19' WIs. STAT.

§2.01 (1963).

192 Note 145 supra.
193 This is but one example. The alteration of county lines in many other instances would have been conducive to a more equitable apportionment
population-wise.
194 Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 2.

195 Memoranda submitted to the Wisconsin Supreme Court on May 1 and May
8, 1964, by Archie Maurer.
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sentatives. It is proper to consider, nevertheless, whether any circumstances could arise under which the court would be compelled to
change the number of its legislative representatives. The Wisconsin
constitution states that the number of assemblymen shall not be less
than 54 nor more than 100 and that the number of state senators must
be between one-third and one-fourth of the number of assemblymen.19
The legislature has declared by statute that the number of assemblymen
shall be 100 and the number of state senators 33.197 If the statutory
number should prevent the construction of a constitutional reapportionment, a court would be required to change that number under both
the Wisconsin and the United States Constitution. The Wisconsin court
in State ex rel. Reynolds makes no exception to its per capita equality
of representation standard for an arbitrary number of representatives
selected by the legislature. The United States Supreme Court in
Reynolds v. Sims does not include such an arbitrary statutory number
in the list of its exceptions to strict population equality, and that Court
allows no exceptions to substantial population equality.
Even if a constitutional apportionment plan could be drawn using
the statutory number of representatives, the court could ignore that
number if a better apportionment would be achieved with a lesser
number of representatives. The statute which declares the number of
legislative representatives is an integral part of Wisconsin's apportionment plan, as it has little meaning apart from the districting process.
Therefore, when the court declares Wisconsin's apportionment law
invalid and takes upon itself the burden of drawing up a constitutional
apportionment plan, it is immaterial whether or not the court's plan
retains the statutory number of legislators, so long as it meets the
constitutional requirements, both state and federal.
The court indicated in State ex rel. Reynolds that it could have
drawn a reapportionment plan more closely approaching population
equality in assembly districts had it disregarded the requirement of
compactness of territory.' 9 In some instances, the court stated, it was
able to balance resulting underrepresentation in the assembly by overrepresentation in the state senate. The Wisconsin constitution requires
that assembly districts be as compact as practicable. 99 How does the
Wisconsin court's action square with the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims? To
the extent that underrepresentation in the assembly is compensated for
by overrepresentation in the state senate, the equal protection clause is
not violated by population inequalities incurred to secure compact ter196 Wis. CoNsT. art. IV, §2.

STAT. §13.01 (1963).
198 Note 24 supra,at 606-07, 128 N.W. 2d at 17.
'" Note 145 supra.

197WIs.
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ritory. This method of balancing inequalities to achieve equality was
explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims."'
The assembly underrepresentation not compensated for by state
senate overrepresentation must be put to the test of substantial population equality. Compactness of territory is one of the exceptions specifically noted by the United States Supreme Court as justifying deviation
from strict population equality 2 0' The deviation, however, may not be
so great as to create substantial population inequality. Just what substantial population equality means in a given situation is difficult to
discern with certitude. It depends to an extent upon the mental attitudes
of the judges examining a given reapportionment plan. Still, it seems
that Wisconsin's Supreme Court reapportionment plan affords substantial population equality despite population deviations allowed to
secure assembly districts with compact territory. It takes 48.4 percent
of the state's population to elect a bare majority of the state senate and
45.4 percent to elect a bare majority of the assembly. 2 While this is
probably not the only consideration behind the concept of substantial
20
population equality, it is the most important one. 3
While legislative discretion in reapportionment has been curbed
considerably by recent Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court
decisions, some amount of discretion still remains with the legislature.
The legislature need not enact the best possible reapportionment plan;
it need only enact a constitutional plan. Does a court when drawing a
reapportionment plan have as much discretion as the legislature or must
it, unlike the legislature, construct the best possible plan? The United
States Supreme Court has not directly answered this question. Still, in
Sims v. Frink04 the district court reapportioned Alabama by combining
the best parts of two invalid plans and ordered this reapportionment
effective only until the next election of the legislature was completed.
The district court indicated that its reapportionment would be unconstitutional as a permanent measure should be the legislature endeavor
to adopt it verbatim. The United States Supreme Court in Reynolds
v. Sims agreed with the district court that its reapportionment plan
would be unconstitutional as a permanent measure. 20 5 The Supreme
Court, nevertheless, affirmed the district court's action in ordering the
next Alabama election under its plan, and commended the plan as a
provisional, temporary, stopgap remedy. 20 6 It could be argued, there200 Note 2 supra, at 577.
Id. at 578.
202 Note 152 supra.
203 The percent of the total state population needed to elect a bare majority of
the legislature is substantially greater under the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reapportionment plan than under any of the plans invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims and its companion cases.
204 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
205 Note 2 supra, at 586-87.
2o6Ibid.
201
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fore, that a court has a wider latitude of discretion in fashioning its
own reapportionment plan as a temporary remedy for malapportionment than the legislature does in enatcing a permanent reapportionment
law. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Reynolds v. Sims
involved an appeal by the lower court defendant. Had the plaintiff,
Sims, appealed alleging that the district court reapportionment diluted
the weight of his vote in the next election, the decision might have been
different. If the district court had ordered its plan effective until the
legislature passed a constitutional plan, as did the Wisconsin court in
State ex rel. Reynolds, it appears that the Court would not have upheld
it if challenged by Sims, as the Court in approving it stressed the fact
that it would be effective only until the next legislative election was
completed.
The Wisconsin County Board Case
The first state supreme court to apply the one man, one vote principle to county board apportionment was the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester,2 0 7 decided January 5, 1965.
The county board apportionment statute (section 59.03 (2) of the Wisconsin statutes) at issue governed the selection of county supervisors
in 70 of Wisconsin's 72 countiesY.0
Relators, two residents of Waukesha County, alleged in their complaint that the operation of section 59.03(2) resulted in gross population disparities between supervisory districts within counties throughout the state. An exhibit made part of the complaint showed an overall
population disparity ratio between the most overrepresented and the
most underrepresented supervisory districts of more than 3 to 1. In
42 counties the ratio was more than 10 to 1 and in Waukesha County
09
it was 66 to 1. Respondent demurred to the merits of the complaint.2
The court (overruling the demurrer) held section 59.03(2) unconstitutional in that it produced population inequality among supervisory
districts violating the equal protection clause of the federal constitution
and article I, section 1, of the Wisconsin constitution.2 10 Article I,
section 1, the court stated, is the substantial equivalent of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.2 1' The court,
in finding section 59.03(2) a state constitutional violation, could not
207 Note 12 supra.
2ot
did not apply to Milwaukee and Menominee Counties. The statute applied
only to counties with a population of less than 500,000. Milwaukee County's
population is greater than 500,00. Menominee County is an Indian reserva-

tion.

A demurrer on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the supreme court was
overruled in a prior opinion. See note 7 supra.
21o This section reads: "All men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."
2 1 State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, supra note 12, at 252.
209
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appeal to article IV, section 3, of the constitution, which is the basis of
the State ex rel. Reynolds per capita equality of population rule. This
is because article IV, section 3, specifically limits itself to the apportionment of "members of the senate and assembly."
Respondent contended that the one man, one vote principle of
Reynolds'v. Sims did not apply to county boards, since their composition and power was statutory rather than constitutional in origin. The
population-based substantial equality rule, it was argued, applied only
to independent-governmental entities deriving their power directly from
the people governed. The court admitted that counties were statutory
legislative creatures. It pointed out, however, that the key to the application of the equal representation principle was not the origin but
the type of power exercised by the governmental entity. If the powers
212
exercised are legislative, then the one man, one vote principle applies.
If they are administrative, it does not apply.
Since the composition of the legislature must conform to the
principle of equal representation, it is logical that the arm or political subdivision of such legislature enacting legislation should
be governed by the same principle of equal representation. 213
(Emphasis added.)
Administrative boards differ from county boards, the court noted, in
that they perform administrative duties, though some of their rules and
regulations may have the effect of law. It seems hard to deny, however,
that in today's complex society administrative boards actually do exercise legislative power, oftentimes with more far-reaching effect upon
214
the populace than county boards
Respondent drew an analogy between county boards, United States
territorial legislatures, and the District of Columbia Board of Commissioners. The state legislature, it was argued, has the same plenary power
over county boards that the United States Congress has over territorial
legislatures and the District of Columbia Board of Commissioners. The
court noted that the state legislature has the power to determine the
type and form of county government, although it could not abolish the
county entirely as a unit of government. The court held that
this analogy goes only to the lack of an express provision in the
constitution granting the right to vote and not to the question of
whether when under the plenary power the right to vote is provided for it must be on the one man-one vote principle.215
212 The court apparently backed up a little on this point when it made the somewhat confusing statement that "we do not now decide [that] every legislative function requires representative-elective execution." Query, whether or
not this admission causes the courts fundamental rationale for imposing the
one man, one vote principle upon county board apportionments to limp a
bit? State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, supra note 12, at 256.
213 Ibid.
214 DAVIS, ADaMNISTRATIVE LAW CASES 112, 113 (1959).
215 State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, supra note 12, at 256.
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Presumably, therefore, the legislature could appoint county supervisors,
but if it chooses to make the positions elective it must employ the equal
representation rule.
In order to afford the legislature a reasonable time properly to
apportion county governmental units (which could not be accomplished
unless the April 6, 1965, county board elections were held under section
59.03 (2), the court gave its declaration of unconstitutionality prospective
effect only (at a date to be set later by the court)- The court indicated
that if no constitutional apportionment law was passed by November 1,
1965, the relators or other interested parties could apply to the court
for an order fixing a date as of which county supervisors elected under
section 59.03(2) would no longer be validly in office, to enjoin future
elections under that statute, or for other appropriate relief.
There is one crucial issue which the court in Sonneborn failed even
to discuss. The one man, one vote principle stems from the conception
that the United States is by the Constitution a representative democracy.
A representative democracy is not possible unless each man's vote is
accorded the same weight. A system of equally weighted voting requires (1) population equality (2) among people at least in some sense
equally affected or governed by the government body in question. The
one man, one vote principle, therefore, has two prongs which must be
considered when applying it.
Suppose, for example, Governing Board X has the power to make
laws binding upon individuals living and voting in Counties A, B, and
C, but does not have the power to make laws binding upon individuals
living and voting in County Z. An apportionment law requiring that
members of Board X be elected on a population equality basis among
Counties A, B, C, and Z would clearly dilute the weight of every vote
in Counties A, B, and C. Now suppose that Board X has the power
to make laws binding upon individuals living and voting in Towns A,
B, and C, as well as Village Z. Its lawmaking power, however, is limited
with respect to Village Z, so that only a small percentage of its laws
which bind individuals living and voting in Towns A, B, and C also
bind individuals living and voting in Village Z. Village Z elects its
own village board, which passes ordinances governing all those matters
upon which Board X is not entitled to legislate for Village Z but is and
does for Towns A, B, and C. An apportionment plan requiring that
members of Board X be elected on a strict population basis by voters
of Towns A, B, and C, as well as Village Z, would dilute every vote
cast in Towns A, B, and C unless the voters of Towns A, B, and C
were given representatives on the village board of Village Z. An apportionment law alloting Village Z proportionately less representation
than Towns A, B, and C (the proportion dependent upon the impact
which Board X's laws have on Village Z as compared to their impact
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upon Towns A, B, and C) is more in accord with the principle of equal
representation embodied in the equal protection clause and article I,
section 1, of the Wisconsin constitution, as it would afford each voter
of Towns A, B, and C, as well as Village Z, an equally weighted vote.
A court, therefore, in applying the one man, one vote principle to
a given apportionment must consider the impact of government upon
the governed. The equal representation rule is not a black letter fiat,
but a rule of some subtlety. Normally, when the question at issue involves the apportionment of a state legislature, as was the case in Reynolds v. Sims, a court will not be called upon to assess specifically the
impact of government upon the populace, for a state government is
sovereign over all its territory.16 When the question at issue, however,
is the apportionment of county boards throughout the state, a court
should assess the realities of county government with a view to determining their impact upon the populace.
This the Wisconsin court did not do in Sonneborn. Except for the
matters of taxation and welfare, Wisconsin county boards exert considerably less legislative influence over those living within cities and
villages than they do over those living in other areas within their territorial boundaries. County boards, for example, may enact zoning
ordinances outside the limits of incorporated cities and villages (whose
councils enact their own ordinances)."' This is not to say that an
It is not impossible, however, to conceive of a situation where governmental
impact would be relevant in determining the validity of a districting plan
apportioning a state legislature. Suppose, for example, residents of a federal
enclave (territory of a state under federal jurisdiction pursuant to article
I, §8, clause 17, of the United States Constitution) challenge an otherwise
constitutional state law apportioning its legislature on the ground that under
the one man, one vote principle the enclave should be accorded an assemblyman. Whatever the result, it seems certain a court could not avoid the impact issue. Cf. 49 CALIF. L. REv. 550 (1961).
217 WIs. STAT. §59.97 (1963). A few additional examples are: Wis. STAT. §59.07
(18) (1963) : [County boards may] "exercise outside of cities and villages
all the powers conferred on cities to regulate dance halls, roadhouses and
other places of amusement."
WIS. STAT. §59.07 (44) (1963): "In counties not containing a city of the
first class, [county boards may] employ a corporation counsel and fix his
salary."
Wis. STAT. §59.07 (38) (1963): [County boards may] "license and regulate
dealers in second-hand motor vehicles, wreckers of motor vehicles, or the
conduct of motor vehicle junking. Such regulation shall not apply to any
municipality which adopts an ordinance governing the same subject."
WIs. STAT. §59.07 (36) (1963): "[County boards may] provide fire department service and protection for such residents as are otherwise unable to
obtain service from a municipality .. "
Wis. STAT. §59.07 (49) (1963): "Billboard regulation.
Such ordinances
shall not apply within cities and villages which have adopted ordinances
regulating the same subject matter."
WIS. STAT. §59.07 (50) (1963) : "Riding horses, regulation.
Such ordinances shall not apply within cities and villages which have adopted ordinances
regulating the same subject matter.
VXis. STAT. §59.07 (51)
(1963) : "Building and sanitary codes.... Such
codes, rules and regulations shall not apply within cities and villages which
have adopted ordinances and codes governing the same subject matter."
216
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assessment of the impact of county boards throughout the state upon
the populace of their respective counties would have altered the final
result in Sonneborn. It is only to suggest that a realistic evaluation of
a state-wide county board apportionment plan in terms of representative equality and the equally weighted vote would require such an assessment.
A FINAL TRIBUTE

Redistricting or reapportionment law is of its very nature conducive
to controversy and conflict. Quite naturally, therefore, courts have been
the subject of rather continuous criticism by segments of the legal
community regardless of what position they have taken with respect
to the adjudication of reapportionment disputes. A few years ago
courts were accused of ignoring substantial justice, as they provided
no practical relief in most districting cases. Today they are accused of
meddling in legislative affairs because they provide that relief.
This serves to exemplify the dilemma with which courts have been
faced in reapportionment cases. On the one hand, they have sought to
dispense substantial justice which includes the granting of practical
relief. On the other, they have sought to avoid a usurpation of legislative power. A thorough reading of the many hundreds of cases touching the redistricting issue compels recognition of the judicial restraint
with which courts have handled this problem. A panoramic view of
reapportionment law, state and federal, from its inception until today
exposes one continuing thread which has been the motivation of judicial conduct throughout. That thread is the rule of necessity. Courts
have entered the thicket of districting only when they felt necessity
compelled them to do so. They have acted slowly, cautiously, and with
restraint.
Viewed in this light, the population equality principle of today is
seen as a necessary extension of prior state districting law rather than
a radical departure into legislative provinces. Democracy in today's
ever more mechanized and populated America can be revitalized by
insuring each citizen an equally strong voice in the politics of his
country.

ROBERT A. MELIN

Such ordinance
Wis. STAT. §59.07 (85) (1963): "Air polution control ...
shall not supersede any town, village, or city ordinance which has been or
may be enacted and which is at least equally restrictive."

